



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KOREA

Divided Nation



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KOREA : FORGOTTEN NATION

KOREA

Forgotten Nation

BY ROBERT T. OLIVER

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY SYNGMAN RHEE
First President, Korean Republic

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

Public Affairs Press

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DEDICATED TO THE UNCONQUERABLE KOREAN PEOPLE

TO THE
KOREAN PEOPLE

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M. B. SCHNAPPER, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND EDITOR**

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"With the restoration of Korean independence, one of the great crimes of the twentieth century will have been rectified, and another stabilizing factor will have been added to the new international system which must be constructed in the Pacific."—SUMNER WELLES.

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INTRODUCTION

America is the hope of Korea. My thirty million countrymen have long considered the American people as their only friends. They know that America, like Korea, is a peace-loving nation that does not harbor any imperialistic ambitions. Although they remember that America has failed and disappointed them so far, they still believe, with all their hearts, that they can count upon the American people if they but come to know the unhappy story of Korea. This excellent book, written by an American for Americans, will do much to make that possible. Its appearance at this time, twenty-five years after the Korean Declaration of Independence, is particularly appropriate.

Although the American people have not realized it, they, as well as the people of the other democracies, are in a very real sense responsible for Korea's plight. They are responsible because they have ignored, for the most part unwittingly, Japanese treachery toward Korea. They are responsible, too, because they have permitted their governments to pursue policies that have directly and indirectly facilitated Japan's exploitation of Korea. And they are responsible because they have assumed that the fate of Korea did not concern them.

Not until December 7, 1941—the day of reckoning—did the democratic peoples begin to fully comprehend that Japan was not merely the enemy of Korea, but, rather, the enemy of the entire civilized world. With each new tragic report of losses of the lives of Allied troops in the Pacific, it has become increasingly clear that Japan should have been dealt with firmly—and not appeased—when its designs upon Korea

clearly evidenced the beginning of a plan to dominate the world.

While the Korean people are, of course, profoundly heartened by the Cairo declaration because it promises them freedom and independence, they are nevertheless deeply disturbed by the silence which has followed that great document. They cannot help but feel that the Cairo declaration in itself is not enough and that their cause deserves more concrete support.

For fifty years now I have been endeavoring to forewarn the world of Japanese aggression. In my own country, my warnings went unheeded—until it was too late. The conservative government and the peace-minded people refused to be disturbed and, as a result of my activities in this connection, I was kept in prison for seven years. When I was released, Korea was already undergoing Japanese domination. In the United States and other democratic nations, my warnings also went unheeded—until it was too late. And I regret to say that the full lesson of Pearl Harbor has not yet been learned.

Korea continues to be treated, for all practical purposes, as a forgotten nation. Although it is the only nation that has defeated Japan in the past, although it was the first victim of Japanese aggression, although it has suffered under enemy rule more and longer than any other occupied country, and although it has been fighting Japan single-handed and unaided ever since 1905, Korea has not been allowed its proper place among the United Nations. The American people must not and cannot permit this situation to continue. Without Korean cooperation the war against Japan may well be prolonged unnecessarily and many American lives lost needlessly.

SYNGMAN RHEE

*First President of the Republic of
Korea and Chairman of the Korean
Commission to the United States.*

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For encouragement in undertaking and persevering in the task of telling the story of Korea under Japanese dominance, I owe thanks to the patient victim of my irregular hours and unsociable behavior while engaged in the work—my wife.

ROBERT T. OLIVER
Washington, D. C.

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PART ONE

The Background

CHAPTER I

FORGOTTEN NATION

The Cairo declaration of November, 1943, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, asserted the intent of the United Nations that "Korea shall, in due course, become free and independent." Issuance of that document marked the end of a long period during which Korea had been forgotten. It is significant that in the first joint meeting ever held by the national leaders of the East and the West, in all their 5,000 years of recorded history, Korea at last was remembered.

I

Comparatively few Americans have ever known Korea—or, for that matter, know of it now. A handful of tourists remember it as Chosen, "the Switzerland of Asia." Some missionary groups describe it as the country in all the Orient most receptive to Christianity. A few businessmen refer to it as a land rich in mineral, hydro-electric, and manufacturing resources, but in which investment possibilities have been sharply restricted by Japanese colonial exploitation policies.

American diplomats have known Korea as "the Hermit

Kingdom" whose isolationism was ended at our invitation in 1882; as a buffer state that for centuries limited the expansion possibilities of Russia, China, and Japan; and as the sacrificial victim ceded to Japan's "protection" in 1905 to appease the Nipponese militarists. It seemed then a cheap means of satisfying Japan's expansive urge. It took time to reveal that this cession was in fact the essential prerequisite to Japan's aggressive designs on the Asiatic mainland. Without those mainland bastions to protect her back door, Pearl Harbor and all that followed it would have been impossible. This is a part of the Korean story that diplomats know.

A few more Americans—most of them specialists in Oriental history—have known Korea as the only country that has defeated Japan in war, thus thwarting her previous most determined effort to gain a foothold on the continent of Asia; as the first victim of Japan's present program of aggression; as a "land of silent people" which has fought for its freedom with every resource of a weaponless, voiceless people; and which has been able for a quarter of a century to maintain a Provisional Government, the oldest of the Republics-in-exile.

But not many Americans have more than a fragmentary knowledge of Korea's long history of homogeneous nationality, of her cultural attainments, or of the long struggle of her leaders to re-establish their country's independence. To many, Korea is only another province of Japan. Where it is, what its people are like, how they have fared under Japanese rule, and what role they should play in the future are questions with which this book is concerned.

II

Korea has been one of the most heroic examples in modern history of a country determined to be free. Every type of exploitation the Japanese could devise it has suffered. For

years it has undergone deprivation and terror of the sort Germany visited on its Central European victims after 1939. It has suffered its own Nankings, and Hong Kongs and Bataans. Through it all the Korean people have resisted every threat and every bribe to become Japanized. After a full generation of struggle and suffering they are tenaciously Korean still.

Here are some of the basic facts behind the Korean story:

Korea was arbitrarily awarded to Japan as a means of settling the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. The United States, in supervising the Treaty of Portsmouth, gave its blessing to that award—despite the treaty of mutual assistance we had signed with Korea when we opened its “closed doors” in 1882. In the latter document we had agreed that “If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”

✓ In annexing Korea in 1910, the Japanese violated their repeated promises and pledges of non-aggression.

✓ In the Treaty of Shimonoseki with China (signed in 1895, after the Sino-Japanese War), Japan had declared in the very first provision: “The two High Contracting Parties hereby recognize and confirm the complete independence of Korea.”

✓ In its agreement of 1898 with Russia, Japan approved this opening clause: “Russia and Japan hereby confirm the recognition of Korea’s sovereign rights and her complete independence.”

In the treaty of alliance with Great Britain, Japan stated: “The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to

be entirely uninfluenced by an aggressive tendency in either country."

In 1904 Japan concluded a Treaty of Defensive and Offensive Alliance with Korea, a document expressly designed to "confirm and uphold the independence of Korea." And in the same year the Emperor of Japan stated in an Imperial Edict: "The independence of Korea is our Empire's real and unfaltering aim and necessity."

In 1905 Korea began to learn how little meaning Japan attached to its pledged word.

Since then the Korean people have fought Japanese control by every means in their power—by revolutionary uprisings in 1905-15, 1919, and 1929; by non-cooperation, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare; and by voluntarily taxing themselves to support an independent Government-in-exile of their own.

Despite their abandonment by almost all the world (China alone excepted), the Korean people have maintained an effective national spirit and force which make them of great potential value in winning the Pacific war and which promise eventual fruition of their plans to rebuild the 4,000-year-old traditions of their native land.

III

The essential facts concerning Korea's background of independent nationality may be simply stated.

Koreans are as different from the Japanese or Chinese racially as Italians are different from Germans or the French.

Their language is distinct from that of any other country—far simpler and more manageable than the languages of China and Japan. Their alphabet of 25 letters is one of the simplest in the world.

The customs, traditions, and civilization of the Korean peo-

ple are their own; they have influenced their neighbors at least as much as they have been influenced themselves. The development of Japan in pre-Commodore Perry times began with its importation of Korean culture.

Korea's history as an independent country is far older than that of Greece or Italy—about as old as that of Egypt, Abyssinia, and the Hebrew tribes. In comparison with Korea, England, France, Germany, and Russia—to say nothing of the United States and the Latin American countries—are all newcomers to the world family of nations.

Koreans invented gunpowder, movable type, the first iron-clad warship, and published an encyclopedia generations before the western world thought of that method of systematizing and stabilizing its accumulated knowledge.

In brief, the Koreans are a homogeneous people with a long tradition of continuity. They are a people who have proved their devotion to self-government at a cost few nations have ever been called upon to pay. And now at last they are standing on the threshold of a rebirth of their independence, with opportunities to make of themselves a nation far better than they have ever been.

IV

For all practical purposes, the modern history of Korea began in 1882, when U. S. Commodore R. W. Shufeldt sailed into Chemulpo Bay and succeeded by diplomacy (where others had failed by force) to persuade the Emperor to exchange his policy of isolation for a treaty of mutual assistance and commercial relations with the United States. The *religious*, *economic*, and *political* penetration of outside powers into Korea followed thereafter in rapid succession.

The work of the Christian Churches in Korea has never been easy. Japan has always frowned upon efforts to Chris-

tianize Korea, just as she has struggled against Christian tendencies on her own islands. As Japan's anti-Occidental program became more and more plain, she imposed ever-sterner restrictions on the Korean Christians. By 1940 all but a handful of missionaries had been driven out. The rest were subsequently interned. Meanwhile Shinto shrines were erected and worship of the Japanese Emperor decreed.

The religious status of Korea today is one of turmoil. What it will be after the war is difficult to foretell. Will the people welcome back representatives of missionary societies that refused to help them in their generation-long struggle against Japan? Will they be as receptive to Western beliefs as before? These are vexing questions for churches having converts in Korea to face.

If the Koreans were to have had any hope of catching up with the outside world in economic development after 1882, they needed an influx of capital, scientific information, and industrial and fiscal management. Their Industrial Revolution, had it been permitted to develop freely, would have been far more overwhelming than anything the Occident had known. Their natural resources were—and are—adequate to sustain a degree of industrialization that could raise them to first rank among Oriental nations. It is significant that at the beginning of the century American investors were ready and eager to take the lead in converting Korea from an agricultural and handicraft people to a manufacturing and trading nation. As a result, however, of Japanese intervention, its economic development was not allowed to take its normal course.

v

Japan's first successful step in her attempt to subjugate and absorb Korea came in 1894, when she went to war to force

China to abandon all influence over Korea. Shortly afterward, on October 8, 1895, the Korean Queen Min, who resisted the spread of Japanese influence over her country, was murdered in her palace at Seoul by a band of Japanese. The Japanese Judge of Preliminary Enquiry, who was appointed by his Emperor to determine the facts of the murder, issued a report unprecedented in the history of international adjudication. He found evidence to establish beyond doubt that the Japanese Minister at Seoul was the principal leader in the plot against the Queen. He described the nature of the plot in detail, named the conspirators who participated in it, and, in describing their machinations, noted that "the whole party entered the palace through the Kwang-wha Gate, and at once proceeded to the inner chambers." Then he concluded with a bland assurance incomprehensible to Western minds: "Notwithstanding these facts, there is no sufficient evidence to prove that any of the accused actually committed the crime originally meditated."

The next three years marked a period of greedy grabbing of Chinese territory which did not leave the European Powers in an appropriate position to condemn Japan's imperialism. Germany took over Kiaochow on a 99-year "lease." France seized Kwangchouwan. Russia secured the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur on the basis of a 25-year lease. ✓ Great Britain clearly revealed how little meaning these terminal dates had by taking Wei-hai-wei "for so long a time as Russia should remain in possession of Port Arthur." Moreover, Britain "leased" 370 square miles opposite Hong Kong for 99 years. The United States kept its hands cleaner, but was more attracted by the hustling spirit of Japan than by "backward" Korea.

Japan prepared for her own future by attacking the Russian fleet without a declaration of war in 1904, just as she was

to attack us at Pearl Harbor, and as she had already attacked China without any declaration in 1894. It was also in 1904 that the Korean Emperor was forced to accept Japanese assurance of "the political independence and territorial integrity" of Korea—on condition that Japanese troops be given right of way through the country to attack Russia. And it was in the following year that Japan used a seemingly innocent clause in the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, as a means of locking the independence of Korea in an iron box.

In 1907 the Korean Emperor Kwang Moo sent secret envoys to The Hague to plead for the independence of his nation. He denied that he had ever acquiesced in the establishment of any protectorate over his country. For this effrontery the Japanese forced Kwang Moo's abdication, placed his imbecile son, Yoong Hi, on the throne under a Nippon controlled Regency, and gave the Japanese Resident-General the same power over Korea's internal affairs which he already exercised over its foreign relations. The formal annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 was merely the official confirmation of an established fact. As early as 1905 the United States withdrew its Minister from Korea in recognition of Japan's suzerainty.

In attempting to draw the fangs of possible Korean revolt, the Japanese Treaty of Annexation sought to win over the national and local leaders of Korea by these two provisions:

"Article V. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will confer peerages and monetary grants upon those Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving of special recognition.

"Article VI. The Government of Japan will, so far as circumstances permit, employ in the public service of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and

in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service."

The Japanese forced the helpless Emperor Yi to bow off the stage, presenting for him a forged message of abdication, adjuring his subjects "not to give yourselves up to commotion, appreciating the present national situation as well as the trend of the times, but to enjoy happiness and blessings by pursuing your occupations in peace and obeying the enlightened new administration of the Empire of Japan."

Thus was the seizure of Korea accomplished. It was an inglorious period to a long history of cultural development and notable achievements. Japan had finally accomplished the goal her militarists had set for themselves centuries earlier.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

A Korean Baedeker—if there were one—would present a picture very attractive to tourists. It would tell of a mountainous peninsula, of unsurpassed scenic beauty; of an Oriental landscape, with walled cities, terraced hillsides, and pagoda temples; of a people distinct from other Orientals in language, customs, and characteristics; and of vestiges of one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Since a Baedeker of Korea is lacking, there is presented in this chapter a brief account of the land, the people, and their culture.

I

The Korean peninsula points almost directly north and south. Japan curves up like the blade of a scimitar on the southeast, enclosing the Sea of Japan which adjoins Korea's eastern coast. Directly south is the East China Sea. To the west, across the Yellow Sea, is China's Shantung peninsula. And on the north is Manchuria, with a narrow arm of Siberia reaching down along the coast to form a 15-mile conterminous border with Korea across the Tumen River.

Korea lies in about the same latitude, has about the same climate, and is similar in both area and size of population to

the combined states of Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the eastern half of Massachusetts. Korea's mineral resources, agricultural lands, hydro-electric potential, and harbors are at least equal to theirs. It is far less industrialized.

Korea's 85,246 square miles make it about three-fifths the size of Japan, two-thirds the size of Italy, and about the same size as England. Like Italy, it is shut in by a rugged mountain range across the northern end of the peninsula and its backbone of mountains runs the length of the country as do Italy's Appennines. An almost unbroken wall of cliffs on the east is contrasted sharply with its deeply indented southern and western shores. Near its 6,000 miles of coastline are some 200 inhabited islands. Korea's ruler was once called, with some exaggeration, "The King of Ten Thousand Islands."

Korea's location makes it one of the world's most strategic areas. Just 100 miles from its northeast corner is Russia's great eastern port, Vladivostok. Japan is only 120 miles from its southern coast. Some of the richest and most developed land in China flanks its western shore, across the Yellow Sea.

In Japanese hands, Korea is an indispensable entry-way to the Asiatic continent. In Russian or Chinese control, it would be "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." As an independent country, Korea will be, in Sumner Welles' judgment, a "stabilizing factor" in the "new international system which must be constructed in the Pacific."

Korea's climate is temperate in the south and cold in the north. At Seoul, below-zero weather is common during January and February. In the mountains, severely cold weather predominates during the winter and the short summer season is both hot and humid. These temperature ex-

tremes, however, are well within the temperate zone variations. The surrounding oceans exercise a moderating and stabilizing influence. Precipitation of rain and snow averages from thirty to forty inches a year.

Like other temperate regions, Korea has four distinct seasons, of which spring and fall are the best. Spring is a process of gradually warming days, bright sunshine, occasional rains, and gentle winds. The hills turn green, the rice paddies sprout, and nature is at its finest. Fall commences abruptly in mid-September, when the rains cease and a cool breath blows over the land. The first frosts come in September or October, the leaves are a riot of bright colors, and winter creeps up so gradually one scarcely knows when it begins.

Korean fields are fertile and their yield is good. Korean rice is highly prized in China and Japan. Barley, rye, wheat, peas, soybeans, and millet also thrive. Livestock are abundant. The cows are big, beefy, and choice. Korean ponies, on the other hand, are very small, but tough and active. The time is well past, however, when Korea's agricultural situation was one of the best in the Orient. As a result of the Japanese policy of exploitation the farmers raise more but get less.

The Manchurian tiger, larger and fiercer than India's Bengal tiger, roams the mountains of Korea in large numbers. Tiger-hunting was until recently an honored profession and the hunters men of unquestioned courage and skill. Small game in abundance furnishes sport for another sort of hunter. Pheasants, ducks, and rabbits are plentiful. Until after the turn of the century hawking was still a popular sport. And the bow and arrow was a weapon preferred by many to guns. At a hundred yards or more many Korean

archers could outshoot in target competition a skilled marksman using a Colt revolver.

Topographically, Korea is mountainous in all sections except along the southwestern slope, where rolling hills are interspersed with low plains. The greatest mountains of Korea are the Kumkang San, or Diamond Mountains, located halfway up the eastern side of the peninsula. They are said to number 12,000 peaks, and are known throughout the Orient for their majestic beauty. These mountains rise abruptly out of the sea and present a craggy aspect of romantic wildness. Sheer granite walls, terra cotta soil, and green-clad slopes alternate in brilliant color designs. Pools, streams, and waterfalls abound. Trails cling to precipitous cliffs, and wayside inns sometimes extend far out over the edge, as though hanging on for very life. Koreans say, "Do not discuss scenic beauty until you have seen the Kumkang San." Formerly the center of Korean Buddhism, there still remain on this mountain range 32 Buddhist monasteries; the ruins of 150 more are still evident. The name itself is thought to be derived from a Buddhist classic, Kumkang Kyung.

The ocean tides of Korea vary from almost none at all in the Japanese Sea on the east to about thirty feet at Chemulpo on the west. Excellent harbors are located along the southern and western shores, and on several of the islands. Fishing is excellent and varied in kind from the great depths of the Japanese Sea to the shallow waters of the Yellow Sea, and from the cold waters of the north to the warm currents of the south.

II

The inhabitants of Korea have been called by Dr. Ales Hrdlicka, famed anthropologist of the Smithsonian Institute,

“the white people of the Orient.” The Koreans originated, he believes, either in northern India or among the Turkic people of Central Asia. These ancient forebears became submerged in the Mongoloid strain and assumed the general Mongolian characteristics.

They remain lighter than the Chinese and Japanese. Light brown eyes are not uncommon and a ruddy complexion is frequently observed among the young. The features are typically finely chiseled. Koreans are less hirsute than the Japanese, who are descended in part from the hairy Ainus. And they are larger and better muscled than the Japs. These distinctions are generalizations which anthropologists are able to make in observing the two peoples as a whole. Looking at them solely as individuals, however, there is no way a Korean can be casually distinguished from a Chinese or Japanese. This is especially true today in the case of Koreans who follow Japanese customs and speak the Japanese language.

The similarities are of ominous import for the Japanese. The workman who applies for a job in a munitions factory may be either a Japanese peasant or a Korean patriot. The spectators at a military or official review may well include Korean guerrillas. The very guards along the miles of supply lines, the picked workers at military depots, the record clerks in the government offices all number an unknown, unregistered quota of Korean spies. In no other country can an underground be so easily organized and maintained. As the record proves, in no other country is it more active and effective.

As the war moves closer to the main islands of Japan, the external similarities of Koreans and Japanese will become factors of ever greater potential value to the United Nations' cause.

III

In Korea as in other Oriental countries, the family is the most important social unit. Married children frequently live in the same house as the parents of the groom. Thus a family establishment may be large. The average size of a family, however, is only 4.72—or less than three children per marriage. Males outnumber females by 104 to 100.

The two chief ceremonials in Korea are weddings and funerals. Both are elaborate affairs. Formerly the cost of a wedding might impoverish a family for years, but in recent time it has become customary for villages to own communally the gold-brocade gowns, filigreed sedan chairs, and other equipment for the wedding ceremony.

In contrast with the ancestor-worship common in Japan, Korean respect for parents does not border on deification. Their King was never endowed with divinity as is the Emperor of Japan. Although the Japanese have made strenuous efforts to introduce into Korea their own creed of Shintoism, they have influenced few except the Japanese immigrants.

In former times Koreans were divided into three social classes: the nobility (known as the Yangban), the middle class (professionals, etc.) and the laborers. Under Japanese rule, the nobility has been subsidized and supported, but the middle class has been almost completely wiped out. One of Korea's tragedies today is the difficulty of developing local leadership among her people. Most persons of ability have been subjugated to Japanese purposes, imprisoned, or driven out of the country. There remain but two classes in Korea today—a largely supine nobility and the inarticulate masses. Struggling to emerge as a new middle class are the students who are in a continual state of ferment and dissatisfaction with Japanese rule.

IV

Since most of the reports we get of the Korean people concern their sufferings and their undercover resistance to Japanese oppression, we sometimes consider them merely as being typically lean, tough guerrilla fighters, flitting about in the hills with weapons in their hands and murder in their hearts. We tend to forget that normally they are farmers, and shopkeepers, and artisans living in little villages with their families and friends, desiring only peace and order and a chance to live.

A lively sense of humor and an earthy common sense are their greatest assets. Their folk-lore is filled with a wisdom akin to that of our own Poor Richard, but illuminated by the poetic imagery of the Orient. Note the quiet humor and insight of these Korean proverbs:

"The blind man stole his own hen and ate it."

"Even the hedgehog says her young are smooth."

"Where there are no tigers, wild cats will be very self-important."

"The cook blames the table because he cannot pile the food high."

"A man who has once been frightened by a tortoise will jump every time he sees a kettle cover."

Where we "lock the stable door after the horse is stolen," Koreans "fill out a prescription after the friends of the sick man have put on mourning clothes." Where we "cast pearls before swine," the Korean "pours instruction into a sow's ear." Our warning that "a stitch in time will save nine" is matched by the Korean admonition that "You can mend with a trowel today what it will take a spade to mend tomorrow." In America "He who dances must pay the piper," but in Korea, "The man who eats the salt must drink the water."

Their common sense is enshrined in such proverbs as:

"It is foolish to mourn over a broken vase."

"Don't kill a bullock for a feast when a hen would suffice."

"Never beg from a man who has once been a beggar himself."

"To make a mountain you must carry every load of earth."

"You cannot expect to lift a heavy stone without getting red in the face."

Their mixture of poetic imagination and the pathos of a long-suffering race is revealed in these sayings:

"A finger prick will demand attention, though the worms be eating the heart unknown."

"What looked like blossoms on the dead tree turned out to be only the white mold of decay."

"You cannot sit in the valley and see the new moon set."

"The flower that blooms in the morning is withered by noon."

"If you use good enough bait the fish will bite, though it kill."

Americans can easily feel a sense of kinship with a people whose folk-lore contains such common sense.

CHAPTER III

EARLY HISTORY

I

The origins of Korea, like those of every other ancient state, are obscure. According to legend, a group of Koreans gathered under a tree in 2333 B.C. and elected as their king a man known as Dangun. He established his capital at Pengyang and named the country Chosen, "the Land of Morning Calm."

The next fixed date in Korean history is 1122 B.C., when a Chinese philosopher and statesman, Kija, established a new dynasty. He also introduced Chinese arts, scholarship, and civilization, which, behind the barriers of mountains that cut off the top of the Korean peninsula, came to have an increasingly indigenous character. This marks the beginning of the distinctive contributions Korea has made to world progress in arts and science.

By the third century B.C. there were 78 tribes on the peninsula, united into the three kingdoms of Silla, Pakpei, and Kokuriu, which flourished from 100 B.C. to 669 A.D. In the latter year the King of Silla united the three and founded a single dynasty much as the seven Saxon kingdoms of England were united by Egbert of Wessex.

In 918 Wang-gun founded the Koryu Dynasty and initiated an age of enlightened progress similar to that established by King Alfred in England. Wang-gun was a devout Buddhist; the great Buddhist monasteries of Korea date from his reign.

It was 476 years later, in 1392, that General Yi Sungkei founded the Yi or Ri Dynasty which, like the Tudors in England, ushered in a period of great national enlightenment, and which—unlike the Tudors—ruled until the end of the monarchy in 1910. This Dynasty covered a period of 516 years and consisted of 28 successive kings. It was during this period that Korea became a great power, and finally fell into the decline that marked its last 100 years.

King Yi Sungkei moved the capital of his kingdom to Seoul. He conscripted 200,000 workmen and constructed a great wall around the city: approximately 7 miles long, 20 feet wide, and from 10 to 20 feet high. Of this wall, with its four great and four small gates, only a small portion still stands as a reminder of the great days of the past.

In the center of Seoul there hangs a great bell which dates from 1468, some 75 years after the establishment of the capital at that city. The story is that the current King Yi ordered his subjects to bring in metals for the casting of a great national bell and that all vied with one another to make the greatest contribution. One woman who had nothing else to give offered her three-year-old child. Her sacrifice was refused. Then, when attempts were made to cast the bell—once, twice, and still another time—they all failed. Word spread that this was because the woman's offering of her child had been rejected. She was sought out, the child was thrown into the molten mass, and the bell was successfully cast. It was 12 feet high and 20 feet in circumference—the

second largest bell in the world. When it was rung, the people thought that below its clangor could be heard a low moan, "ah-me-la-la," which they declared was the cry of the child for his mother. This bell stands silent now, awaiting Korea's day of freedom.

II

It was under King Tai-chong (1401-1418), third of the Yi Dynasty, that the development of Korean culture began. He founded four colleges in the four quarters of the country, established a foundry for the making of metal movable type (40 years before Gutenberg), and encouraged scholarship and the arts.

His successor, Sei-Chong (1418-1450), built a public hall where the classics were expounded—a prototype of the American Chautauqua development of a much later day—reformed the penal system, edited significant books, and stimulated mechanical arts. King Sei-Chong's greatest contribution to Korea was the invention of the Korean alphabet—a linguist's dream, incomparably simpler than Chinese or Japanese. He sent a group of picked scholars on various trips to China, seeking linguistic cues. The alphabets of Tibet, which were readily available in Buddhist monasteries, gave them the cue they sought.

But in view of the fact that the Tibetan language was built around consonants and the Koreans considered the vowel the heart of the syllable, they composed another alphabet of eleven vowels and fourteen consonants. Every letter has one sound, and every sound one letter. Anyone who speaks the Korean language can learn to read and write it in two weeks. Contrast its simplicity with Chinese, which is a life study for scholars. And think what that simple alphabet plus movable type means to the average Korean.

The promise offered by this combination was fulfilled. The next hundred years were Korea's Golden Age. Literature and the ceramic and architectural arts reached an exceedingly high plane in this period. When Europe was just emerging from the Crusades, the Koreans published in 112 quarto volumes the first encyclopedia, Moonhunbiko, a copy of which may be seen in the Library of Congress at Washington. Westerners had to wait until the Eighteenth century for any comparable achievement. Korea's development might have lasted longer and gone further had it not been ended by one of the worst calamities any nation has had to endure.

III

[In 1590, Hideyoshi, the Napoleon of Japan, embarked on the realization of his dream of creating an Asiatic Empire to comprise Japan, Korea, China, India, Persia, Formosa, and the Philippines. To the rulers of each of them he sent an audacious letter. The tenor is indicated by the following passage from his message to the King of Korea:

"Hideyoshi, the Supreme Imperial Advisor of the Emperor of Japan, hereby addresses His Excellency the King of Korea. . . . Although I was born to a family of low rank, my mother conceived me immediately after she had dreamed that the Sun had entered into her bosom. A physiognomist interpreted this dream and predicted that I was destined to extend my authority to all parts of the world where the sun shines. When I came to manhood, my benevolent rule would be admired by nations in every direction. People within the four seas would all come under my influence and power. Because I was born with so great a destiny, which was revealed by this omen, those who have fostered feelings of enmity and opposition have been crushed and destroyed. Whenever and against whomever I have waged war, the vic-

tory has always been mine. The lands and districts entered upon a period of peace and prosperity. . . .

"I am not willing to spend the remaining years of my life in the land of my birth. According to my idea, the nation that I would create should not be separated by mountains and seas, but should include them all. In starting my conquest, I planned that our forces should proceed to China and compel the people there to adopt our customs and manners. Then that vast country, consisting of more than four hundred provinces, would enjoy our imperial protection and benevolence for millions of years to come—You, King of Korea, are hereby instructed to join us at the head of all your fighting men when we proceed to China. . . ."

The Koreans did not, as he expected, accept his scheme. Accordingly, in 1592, having completed the greatest mobilization ever achieved in Asia, he swept into Korea with an army of 350,000 men. He confidently expected to march right on to the conquest of China. Actually in seven years of hard fighting, he never got beyond Korea and never conquered it.

The Koreans were completely unprepared. Their King had not believed or heeded Hideyoshi's boastful letter. As *Mein Kampf* proved to be for our generation, it had seemed to him too fantastic to be real. Hence the Japanese were able to land at Fusan, on the southern tip of the peninsula, without opposition and to move north rapidly. They annihilated the hastily assembled citizen army sent against them, and advanced on Seoul, the capital. The Korean King fled north to Pengyang and continued to organize resistance.

IV

The apparent overwhelming strength of the Japanese was offset by one fatal weakness—their lack of a navy. The

whole vast army was supported by a naval force of only 9200 men. And these were divided among a fleet of 700 small vessels. Although the Koreans had no army, they had developed a powerful navy to protect their coast. And they had an Admiral, Yi-Soon-Sin, able to see and seize an opportunity.

Admiral Yi designed and built a number of huge iron-clad war vessels known as "turtle ships." With these he sought out a 50-ship unit of the Jap fleet on May 7, 1592, and sank 40 of them. On June 5 he destroyed 43 more; on July 8 another 63; and on July 12, 42 more. After this battle the remaining Japanese vessels took refuge in the harbor of Fusan and left Korea in secure command of the sea. Believing he could wipe out the Jap fleet and thus entrap the huge invasion army, Yi boldly sailed into Fusan harbor on September 1, 1592, under the combined fire of 470 Japanese ships and the shore batteries. He destroyed 100 enemy ships and succeeded in completely bottling up the Japanese fleet.

As a result, the Japanese supply problem was so acute that further advance was impossible. In April, 1593, the forces that had captured Seoul were forced to abandon it and retreat to the South. It was January, four years later, before they were able to move north again. This time, with a force of only 150,000 men (reduced from the original 350,000) Hideyoshi's generals moved forward more slowly, making a final desperate attempt to capture the peninsula. But their efforts were futile. Hideyoshi's grandiose scheme to conquer all Asia vanished with the destruction of his fleet. Then suddenly, on August 18, 1598, after a heart attack, Hideyoshi died.

The Japanese took back from Korea as "souvenirs" thirty

thousand "pickled ears and noses"—an interesting commentary on the background of present Japanese brutality.

v

For Korea the period was disastrous. Her freedom had been preserved, but her chief cities were sacked, her villages burned, her population decimated, her art treasures stolen, her scholars and artisans carried off to Japan. It was a hundred years before she recovered sufficiently to experience another renaissance of learning and art. Politically, Korea never did recover from the disintegrating consequences of the Seven Years War.

Japan, on the other hand, had failed in Hideyoshi's grandiose plan of conquest, but had won in all else. Great land victories aroused military ambitions which never thereafter had died. The ears of 50,000 Koreans were interred in a huge mound at Hideyoshi's home at Kyoto, in perpetual memory of the victories won by his troops.

Along with their other loot from Korea, the Japanese brought back all the advances in art and science the Koreans had achieved. With the movable metal type they had seized they printed Japanese books in quantity for the first time. Out of their enslavement of the makers of the famed Korean porcelain ware, there arose the famous "Japanese" porcelain wares of Satsuma, Hirado, Rousan, Ogan, Takatori, and Hagi—while in Korea itself, which developed the art, the skill to make fine porcelains gradually died out.

It was not until the Eighteenth century that Korea was able to recover some of the cultural ground it had lost. Protected by its policy of complete isolation, it was spared the devastation of further foreign attacks for 300 years. Aside from its loose ties with China, it remained completely withdrawn from the rest of the world. No foreign ships were

allowed to land at its ports, and no Koreans travelled abroad. It was during this period that Korea became known as "The Hermit Kingdom."

When its isolationism was forcibly ended, first by Japan in 1876, then by the United States in 1882, the Kingdom of the Yi's was ill-fitted to cope with the militaristic and economic powers of the more developed nations. Having planned only to live in isolated peace, it lacked both the resources and the sophistication to protect itself against the determined aggression of Japan.

CHAPTER IV

MODERN HISTORY

When the Japanese assumed a protectorate over Korea in 1905, and appointed Marquis Ito as Resident-General to rule the country, one of the first steps taken was to disarm and disband the Korean National Army. This led to the first of a long series of revolutions.

Many of the soldiers organized guerrilla units which became known as the Eui-pyung—"The Righteous Army." They were joined by tiger hunters from the hills and by farmers from the valleys. For years these bands waged effective guerrilla warfare. When a Japanese army was sent against them, they faded away into the mountains. When the army withdrew, they struck at outlying posts and communications lines. The Japanese retaliated by destroying scores of villages and executing hundreds of suspected revolutionists.

The effectiveness of these revolutionary uprisings was attested by a proclamation issued by the Japanese military commander:

"I, General Baron Yoshimichi Hasegawa, Commander of the Army of Occupation in Korea, make the following an-

nouncement to each and every one of the people of Korea throughout all the provinces. Taught by the natural trend of affairs in the world and impelled by the national need of political regeneration, the Government of Korea, in obedience to His Imperial Majesty's wishes, is now engaged in the task of reorganizing the various institutions of State. But those who are ignorant of the march of events in the world and who fail correctly to distinguish loyalty from treason have by wild and baseless rumors instigated people's minds and caused the rowdies in various places to rise in insurrection. These insurgents commit all sorts of horrible crimes, such as murdering peaceful people, both native and foreign, robbing their property, burning official and private buildings, and destroying means of communication. Their offenses are such as are not tolerated by heaven or earth. They affect to be loyal and patriotic and call themselves volunteers. But none the less they are lawbreakers, who oppose their Sovereign's wishes concerning political regeneration and who work the worst possible harm to their country and people.

"Unless they are promptly suppressed the trouble may assume really calamitous proportions. I am charged by His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea, with the task of rescuing you from such disasters by thoroughly stamping out the insurrection. I charge all of you, law-abiding people of Korea, to prosecute your respective peaceful avocations and be troubled with no fears. As for those who have joined the insurgents from mistaken motives, if they honestly repent and promptly surrender they will be pardoned of their offense. Any of you who will seize insurgents or will give information concerning their whereabouts will be handsomely rewarded. In case of those who wilfully join insurgents, or afford them refuge, or conceal weapons, they shall

be severely punished. More than that, the villages to which such offenders belong shall be held collectively responsible and punished with rigor. I call upon each and every one of the people of Korea to understand clearly what I have herewith said to you and avoid all reprehensible action."

The revolt of "The Righteous Army" was intensified in 1910, when Japan formally annexed Korea, changed its name to Chosen, a province of Japan, and named the brutal Count Terauchi as the first (and worst) of the Korean Governor-Generals. Determined to put down all revolt by the harshest of measures, Terauchi bluntly informed the Korean people: "I will whip you with scorpions." His policies were reflected by the semi-official *Seoul Press* when it declared:

"The present requires the wielding of an iron hand rather than a gloved one in order to secure lasting peace and order in this country. There is no lack of evidence to show an intense dissatisfaction against the new state of things is fermenting at present among a section of the Koreans. . . . Japan is in this country with the object of promoting the happiness of the masses. . . . She must be prepared to sacrifice anybody who offers obstacles to her work. . . . There is but one way to deal with these people, and that is by stern and relentless methods."

II

When the next revolutionary movement arose, it took a very different form. In 1919 the deposed Emperor Yi died and March 4th was to be set aside for traditional mourning rites in the city of Seoul. Since Koreans from all parts of the country were to be allowed to gather for the occasion, leaders of the underground revolutionary movement saw this as the opportunity they were awaiting.

The time to strike for freedom was opportune. In advocating, in that very year, the establishment of the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson had electrified the Korean people—as well as the peoples of other small countries—when he explained that the League's purpose was "to provide for the freedom of small nations, to prevent the domination of small nations by big ones." One leader of the revolutionists, Dr. Syngman Rhee, had gone to the United States and had met Woodrow Wilson at Princeton: he and others felt convinced that a courageous uprising of Koreans would win sympathy from America and recognition by the League.

What was planned for March 4th was a demonstration, not a revolution. The Korean leaders wanted to stage a tremendous passive revolt. They believed that if they offered dramatic proof of a united resolve for independence, and did it absolutely without violence, they would have more effect than by hurling their weaponless followers upon the Japanese army.

Under the direct leadership of Pastor Kil and Yi Sang-jai in Korea, and Dr. Rhee in America, they quietly organized an independence army in all parts of Korea. To all their followers they sent these unusual instructions:

"Whatever you do
"Do not insult the Japanese
"Do not throw stones
"Do not hit with your fists
"For these are the acts of barbarians."

Into every village went these instructions and with them went copies of a Korean Declaration of Independence. School girls carried the material from village to village, hidden in their sleeves. From hand to hand, they were passed on

throughout the country. And despite Japanese spies in every village, some two million Koreans were organized in this way without their plans becoming known.

Aware that something was afoot, although they could not determine its character, the Japanese made arrangement for complete military control of the populace on March 4th. The Korean leaders foiled these preparations by suddenly setting forward the date of their demonstration to Saturday, March 1. At two o'clock all over the country, groups were to gather, hear the Declaration of Independence read, wave their forbidden flags, and shout "Mansei!" (the old national battle cry, meaning, "May Korea live ten thousand years"). Only that. Then they were to disperse and quietly go home.

Heading the demonstration, 33 of the leaders in Seoul chose martyrdom for their lot. At the appointed hour, they drew forth the Declaration of Independence and, with calm dignity, read it through. They were imprisoned, tortured, and many died in jail. Their names have a special place in Korean history. To the Declaration of Independence, they had added these three articles:

"1. This work of ours is in behalf of truth, religion and life, undertaken at the request of our people, in order to make known their desire for liberty. Let no violence be done to any one.

"2. Let those who follow us, every man, all the time, every hour, show forth with gladness this same mind.

"3. Let all things be done decently and in order, so that our behavior to the very end may be honorable and upright."

The signatures attached to the document were: Son Pyung-hi, Kil Sun Chu, Yi Pil Chu, Paik Yong Sung, Kim Won Kyu, Kim Pyung Cho, Kim Chang Choon, Kwon Dong Chin, Kwon Byung Duk, Na Yong Whan, Na In Hup, Yang Chun Paik, Yang Han Mook, Lew Yer Dai, Yi Kop

Sung, Yi Mung Yong, Yi Seung Hoon, Yi Chong Hoon, Yi Chong Il, Lim Yei Whan, Pak Choon Sueng, Pak Hi Do, Pak Tong Wan, Sin Hong Sik, Sin Suk Ku, Oh Sei Chang, Oh Wha Young, Chung Choon Su, Choi Sung Mo, Choi In, Han Yong Woon, Hong Byung Ki, Hong Ki Cho.

In the Pagoda Park of Seoul and in the public parks of other cities, the demonstrations took place as planned. Japanese authorities responded with hysterical fear and ruthless cruelty. Troops charged upon the crowds, firing guns, swinging swords, and pursuing helpless victims with firemen's hooks which left terrible wounds. Arms and ears were sliced off. Thousands were beaten; at least 200,000 were arrested; not less than 7,000 were killed.

What the Japanese tersely called "mopping up" operations continued for a week. Still the Koreans shouted "Man-sei!" Still they stood by their Declaration of Independence, and still they resisted with all the moral force of their convictions.

At the end, several Korean churches had been burned—filled with men, women, and children who attended "independence" meetings in them. Scores of villages were destroyed. Thousands of mutilated men, ravished girls, and orphaned children were left to meditate on how the Japanese dealt with unarmed protestations against the injustice of their rule.

III

Out of the bloody disorders of those black days of March and April, 1919, came greater courage and determination. The following leaders from the thirteen Korean provinces assembled in Seoul on April 16 to draw up plans for a Provisional Republic: Yee Man Jik, Yee Nai Su, Pak Han Yung, Pak Chang Ho, Yee Yeng Jun, Choi Chun Koo, Yee

Yong Kiu, Yu Sik Kiu, Yu Jang Wuk, Song Ji Hun, Yee Tong Wuk, Kim Taik, Kang Hoon, Kim Hyung Sun, Yu Keun, Kang Ji Yung, Chang Seung, Kim Heyen Chun, Kim Ryu, Kim Sig, Chu Ik, Hong Seung Wuk, Chang Chun, Chung Tam Kio, Pak Tak. They constituted themselves a National Council and proceeded to formulate a constitution and to elect officers.

As President of the new Republic of Korea they chose Dr. Syngman Rhee. At the same time, in Siberia and in Manchuria, two other groups of self-exiled Koreans were forming independent governments, and both of them similarly named Dr. Rhee as, respectively, President and Premier. When these other groups learned of the formation of the Provisional Republic, they merged themselves with it, and thus constituted a united revolutionary government.

The new government's cabinet, meeting at Shanghai, where the first National Assembly was held, consisted of these leaders who had escaped from Korea: Prime Minister—Dong Hui Yee, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Youngman Park, Minister of Interior—Dong Yung Yee, Minister of War—Pak Yin Roe, Minister of Finance—Si Yung Yee, Minister of Law—Kiu Sik Cynn, Minister of Education—Kiusic Kimm, Minister of Communications—Chang Bum Moon, Director of Bureau of Labor—Chang Ho Ahn, Chief of Staff—Tong Yul Lew, Vice Chief of Staff—Sei Yung Lee, Vice Chief of Staff—Nam Soo Hahn.

The following provisional Constitution was drawn up and adopted:

“By the will of God, the people of Korea, both within and without the country, have united in a peaceful declaration of their independence, and for over one month have carried on their demonstrations in over 300 districts, and because of

their faith in the movement they have by their representatives chosen a Provisional Government to carry on to completion this independence and so to preserve blessings for our children and children's children.

"The Provisional Government, in its Council of State, has decided on a Provisional Constitution, which it now proclaims.

"1. The Korean Republic shall follow republican principles.

"2. All powers of State shall rest with the Provisional Council of State of the Provisional Government.

"3. There shall be no class distinction among the citizens of the Korean Republic but men and women, noble and common, rich and poor, shall have equality.

"4. The citizens of the Korean Republic shall have religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of writing and publication, the right to hold public meetings and form social organizations and the full right to choose their dwellings or change their abode.

"5. The citizens of the Korean Republic shall have the right to vote for all public officials or to be elected to public office.

"6. Citizens will be subject to compulsory education and military service and payment of taxes.

"7. Since by the will of God the Korean Republic has arisen in the world and has come forward as tribute to the world peace and civilization, for this reason we wish to become a member of the League of Nations.

"8. The Korean Republic will extend benevolent treatment to the former Imperial Family.

"9. The death penalty, corporal punishment and public prostitution will be abolished.

"10. Within one year of the recovery of our land the National Congress will be convened."

✓ However, the peace-makers at Paris, considering that Japan had given at least nominal support to the Allied cause in the war, refused to consider the Korean claim of independence. When Japanese delegates threatened to withdraw from the Peace Conference if the Korean question were raised, President Woodrow Wilson acquiesced in keeping it completely off the agenda. Dr. Syngman Rhee, who sought to go to Paris to plead his country's case, was refused a passport by the State Department in Washington. For the time being, at least, the issue of Korean nationality remained closed.

IV

The leaders chiefly associated with the Korean independence movement constitute a striking group of personalities.

In the year of the Empress' murder, 1895, Dr. Syngman Rhee, a scion of one of Korea's old and scholarly families, was diverted from pursuing the traditional Oriental study of the classics by the exhortations of Dr. Philip Jaisohn and his associates in the Progressive-Independence movement. Despite the fact that Rhee was then only 20 years old, he soon became one of the outstanding progressive leaders. To extend his usefulness, he learned English from American missionaries and published in Seoul Korea's first daily newspaper. In an effort to stop Rhee's activities, the Emperor appointed him to the Imperial Privy Council but ordered the arrest of 17 other leaders of the Progressive-Independence group. Rhee later forced their release and pardon by the Emperor.

Nevertheless, Rhee continued in his fight against the retrogressive and oppressive measures of the Emperor and

became head of the Independence Party. His attempts to force acceptance of liberal reforms caused him to be arrested and put in prison in 1897, where he remained until 1904. Despite torture and close confinement, Rhee managed not only to smuggle out messages and articles to his followers, but to write a book, *The Spirit of Independence*, which was clandestinely taken to America and printed and distributed with funds donated by Korean laborers. It is still the inspiration and guide of freedom-loving Koreans everywhere.

After his release from prison, Rhee went to the United States, determined to prepare himself to instruct his people concerning Western education and Christianity. To this end he successively earned the degrees of A.B. from George Washington University, M.A. from Harvard, and Ph.D. from Princeton. He returned to Korea in 1910 and organized and led the Korean Christian Student Movement. After two years he was forced to flee in order to escape arrest by the Japanese. He then went to Hawaii, where he founded a Christian school for Koreans.

While Rhee was imprisoned, another courageous leader in the cause of Korean independence appeared upon the scene in the person of Kim Koo, now chairman of the Provisional Government, then the 21-year-old son of wealthy landed gentry.

In 1899 Kim Koo found himself in the same village with Captain Tsuchida, one of the murderers of the Empress, and avenged her death by strangling the Japanese with his bare hands. Kim Koo then wrote his name and address in a conspicuous public place and set forth the reason why he killed Tsuchida. He was arrested and condemned to death, but the Emperor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. In

1901, however, Kim Koo escaped; disguised as a Buddhist priest, he lived for a while in the mountains.

For years, thereafter, he managed to spread the gospel of Christianity, independence, and modernization throughout the country. In 1910 he was arrested again and spent seven years in prison. After his release, he devoted himself to planning and directing guerrilla activities.

Another of the younger and more radical leaders who emerged from the cauldron of the Mansei Revolution of 1919 was Kim Yak San, now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Korean National Army under General Li Chung Chun. General Kim Yak San was born in Kyungsang Province in Southern Korea and was 24 years old at the time of the 1919 massacres. Prior to 1919, however, Kim Yak San had already been engaged in organizing sabotage, guerrilla warfare and "suicide squads" among the Koreans and had attended the Wangpas Military College in Canton to prepare himself for future leadership. As a guerrilla leader, saboteur and organizer of subversive activities, with over 300 Japanese assassinations to his credit, Kim Yak San is one of the most famed, feared, and experienced revolutionaries in the world.

The present Commander-in-Chief of the existing consolidated Korean Army, General Li Chung Chun, was a Captain in the Japanese Army before he left it to join the Korean revolutionists in 1919. General Li was born in Seoul and educated in Japan. He graduated from a military academy with signal honors and later gained distinction in the siege of Tsingtao in 1916. General Li could have enjoyed riches and security in the employ of the Japanese, but instead he chose to dedicate his life to the cause of Korean liberty and, with thousands of other Korean patriots, he willingly faced the hardships and dangers of guerrilla warfare on the Man-

churian frontier. Throughout the 1920's General Li, besides engaging the Japanese in intermittent raids and battles on the border, established a military academy for officers in Irkutsk, Siberia, and trained thousands of young Korean soldiers. His name became a byword, especially after he had ambushed and annihilated, with a few ill-equipped Korean battalions, the renowned Japanese Ihitsuka regiment. His death or capture was hopefully printed on many occasions in the Japanese press, but when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931 General Li was in command of the Northern Route Sino-Korean Army and bitterly contested Japanese advances.

These are the leaders who are guiding the destinies of Korea's Provisional Government today. For 25 years they have kept the trust reposed in them by the "Mansei!" cries of 1919. They have been supported by the loyalty of 10,000 Koreans in this country and Hawaii, and by several hundred thousand in China, who have voluntarily taxed themselves to provide the meager budget on which the independence movement has functioned. They and the leaders of the underground movement in Korea itself are the best hope of the 30 million Koreans in the homeland.

v

To attempt to set forth in detail the yearly activities of the Provisional Government during its existence would require several volumes. However, as an example, let us select the depression year 1932, and briefly review the major activities in which it was engaged.

In that year the Korean Congress convened as always and regularly elected the officials of the Government. These were: President—Dr. Syngman Rhee; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Tjo Sowang; Minister of War—Kim Koo; Min-

ister of Finance—Kim Chul; Minister of Interior—Cho Wan-koo; Minister of Justice—Yu Dong-yul.

Funds were appropriated to support the underground organizations and to continue distribution of the usual orders, messages and propaganda pamphlets. Kim Yak San was conducting a training school for saboteurs in Nanking, many of the graduates of which were and still are the organizers and managers of the efficient underground network. It is for them that the Provisional Government is today begging America for aid and equipment to help them strike at the vital life-lines of the Japanese. More than 30,000 Koreans of all ranks were resisting the Japanese in Manchuria under the leadership of General Li Chung Chun, and the usual subversive activities were being carried on in China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan.

For instance, Li Bong-chang, a member of the Provisional Government's "suicide squad," was sent to Tokyo in an attempt to kill the Mikado. After careful investigation and preparation Li threw a bomb in the midst of a procession on January 8, 1932. Due to a last-minute change in plans, the Mikado was in a different car than he was expected to be in and escaped injury. A number of high Japanese officials, however, were killed or wounded.

In April 29, 1932, many prominent Japanese generals and government officials held a meeting in Honkew Park in Shanghai to celebrate the conquest of Manchuria. Another of the Provisional Government's "suicide squad," Yun Bong Kil, was selected to bomb the meeting. By means of a clever disguise, he was able to get close enough to throw a powerful grenade onto the reviewing platform. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Sirakawa, and General Kawahara were killed; Admiral Nomura, Ambassador to the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, was severely wounded

and lost the sight of one eye; and nearly a dozen other high Japanese officials were injured. Thus did Yun Bong Kil willingly sacrifice his life to avenge the countless thousands of Korean patriots who had been tortured and murdered by the Japanese, and to demonstrate that the patriots of Korea would fight on to deliver their people from Japanese oppression.

In the succeeding years the story of the Provisional Government followed essentially the pattern of 1932. Its officials continued to accept the risks involved in order to keep alive the cause of the Korean people. From time to time leaders of the Government were arrested by the Shanghai police and turned over to the mercy of the Japanese, but the fate of their colleagues did not divert other fugitive patriots from steady adherence to their duty and their ideals.

VI

The increasing persecution in Shanghai, however, finally compelled the Korean Government to seek shelter elsewhere. Following the Honkew bombing, it fled to nearby Hang-chau and later to Chin-Kiang, adjacent to Nanking. The Japanese attack upon China in 1937 caused the Government to move again—this time to Changsha. After meeting in several smaller cities, it arrived in Chungking in 1938. It has been functioning there ever since.

In January, 1939, all the Korean organizations in Chungking, except the Korean Communist group with the Volunteer Corps, were united under the Korean Provisional Government with Kim Koo reelected as chairman of the Executive Yuan. In October, 1940, the 32nd Congress opened with 26 members present. Cho Sung-whan was chosen Secretary of War and General Chung-chun as commander-in-chief of the National Army, and General Liu Dong-Yul as

Commander of the Chungking area. The biggest annual appropriation since 1920 was adopted, amounting to a total of \$570,000, the funds coming partly from the Chinese Government and partly from voluntary taxation of Koreans in China, Hawaii, and the United States. On September 17, 1941, the 33rd Congress opened. Song Pyengcho was chosen as Speaker of the Congress. Dr. Syngman Rhee was again confirmed as President and Chairman of the Korean Commission to the United States and Kim Koo was reelected Chairman of the Executive Yuan.

The determination and perseverance of the patriots of the Provisional Government in their fight to regain the independence of their country, despite the apathy or antagonism of the great democratic nations, has held them together in united effort for a quarter of a century. There have, of course, been differences between the conservatives and the radicals, as to policy and procedure, but notwithstanding such differences there have been no irreparable schisms among the underground leaders and exiled patriots. Thus it is today, as throughout the life of the Provisional Government, that the Korean people are presenting a united front to the world. Thus it is today that they swear allegiance to their true Government, which for twenty-five years—in the face of despair, persecution and harrowing hardships—has held on high the torch of Korean liberty. Who will lead them tomorrow is a question only tomorrow can answer. Their one thought today is that they will no longer submit to domination by Japan.

PART TWO

Japanese Yoke

CHAPTER V

“CO-PROSPERITY”?

The Korean people have been deeply moved by President Roosevelt's statement of the Four Freedoms. It has never been printed, of course, in Korean newspapers—for they have no freedom of press. It has never been discussed in even small groups in Korea—for they have no freedom of speech. It has not been mentioned in any church—for the Korean Church is firmly controlled by the Japanese. Nevertheless, there are doubtless few Koreans who, by now, are unfamiliar with this passage in President Roosevelt's speech of January 6, 1941:

“In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

“The first is freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world.

“The second is freedom for every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world.

“The third is freedom from want . . . anywhere in the world.

"The fourth is freedom from fear . . . anywhere in the world"

It has been well said that no people understand what freedom is until they lose it. It is one of those undramatic values that we take for granted until deprivation makes it terribly important.

Koreans have learned the value of the four freedoms as we Americans will never learn it. What our country experienced in pre-Revolutionary days is as nothing to the systematic oppression the Korean people have endured. They have lived in fear and in want. They have suffered a voiceless despair. They have seen their very churches changed into an instrument of the government they despise. Millions of Koreans alive today have never known any other kind of life. And still they resist. Still they struggle for self-rule. Still they keep alive their love of country, their self-respect as a people, their determination to shake off the Japanese yoke.

To the Korean people, their nationality is considerably more than a flag or a tradition. It is a way of life they feel they must regain because without it they have nothing. They have no security in their homes, in their persons, or in their livelihoods. They cannot decide for themselves how they will live, or think, or act. They know that, hard as they may work, and wisely as they may plan, whatever they may accumulate above mere sustenance will be taken from them. And they undergo the humiliation of seeing their children's minds and bodies warped by every means in their conqueror's hands.

The newspapers carry only the Japanese brand of news.

The schools teach only the Japanese view of history, philosophy, politics, and social organization.

The churches have been persecuted for even referring to

"The Kingdom of Heaven"—for the only kingdom Koreans may hear about is Japanese.

Public meetings are held only to explain and exhort Japanese doctrine.

The names of cities, wayside signs, shrines and monuments, all are changed to Japanese.

The people are commanded to adopt Japanese customs, speak the Japanese language, and think none but Japanese thoughts.

For a full generation this process has gone on. So far it has had small success. But it is little wonder that the Koreans are determined to be free.

The following chapters present such details as Japanese censorship has allowed to trickle out. Damning as the record is, based on what we know to be true, it must be remembered that the indictment is very far from complete. Not until the 30 million Koreans who still suffer under Japanese rule are free to speak for themselves can the bloody record be fully set forth.

There is enough evidence here to make abundantly clear the real nature of the Japanese. There is more than enough in these pages to tear aside the hypocrisy of the Nipponese slogans, "Asia for Asiatics," and "An Eastern Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Past actions are a fairly good indication of future intentions. Japan has had a full generation in Korea to develop and demonstrate her colonial policies. The record is one of ruthless and rampant militarism. In the following four chapters the story of the suppression and exploitation of Korea speaks for itself.

CHAPTER VI

FREEDOM OF SPEECH?

Freedom of speech has been variously interpreted. Dr. Samuel Johnson, the 18th Century English philosopher, phrased it in its lowest terms. "Every blockhead has a right to say what he thinks," he said, "and every honest man has a right to knock him down for it." Not even this minimum right has been allowed to the Koreans. The Japanese have reserved the right to knock them down, but do not grant them the coordinate privilege of saying what they think.

Freedom of speech, interpreted in national terms, must mean the right to learn the truth, as well as to utter it. It must include the right of free access to facts, and of critical appraisal of them. It means that within reasonable limits individuals can exercise their own judgment and can strive by argument and exposition to influence others to agree with them. It involves the right to publish newspapers free from censorship, to hold public meetings for the discussion of community problems, to meet together for discussion and exchange of ideas. And it depends basically on the right of schools to teach whatever their unhampered scholarship finds to be the truth. All of these rights are necessarily incorporated in our understanding of the term *freedom of speech*.

None of these rights are allowed to the Korean people. There is no article in the whole code of freedom of speech which they have not been denied. If their minds have escaped enslavement, it is not from want of any effort the Japanese could devise.

I

The school system offers a fair example of what has happened to Korean freedom of speech.

There are, as a matter of fact, two school systems existing side by side: one for Koreans, one for Japanese. They have only one thing in common—to make their pupils into submissive subjects of the Son of Heaven. This aim is frankly and vigorously stated and reiterated by the Japanese. Two sample declarations concerning Korean education, taken from official messages of the Japanese Governor-General of Korea, make clear their purpose in training the minds and characters of the youths in their charge:

(1) “To mould our national character, to form our national morals, to cultivate a firm and fiery national faith—these are the first principles in our national education.” (To the Governors of the Provinces, April 20, 1937.)

(2) “Reverence and respect, together with loyalty to the Emperor, the relations between sovereign and subject, are the bases of the establishment of our Nation, the crowning glory of the fundamental character of our national policy, and the essentials of our national moral virtue.” (From the Annual Report of the Administration of Chosen, 1936-37.)

While engaged as the Peking correspondent of the *China Press* in 1920, Nathaniel Peffer summed up his impressions of the Japanese educational system in Korea: “Of schools there are more than there were in the old Korean regime, but they deliberately and often dishonestly implant Japanese

✓ teachings and a purely Japanese culture; the Korean is taught to despise his own civilization, though it is the source of Japanese civilization. The principals of the schools are all Japanese, the textbooks are practically all Japanese, the Japanese language is used almost exclusively as the medium of instruction. Where the Korean child is taught his own language at all it is as a literary language, almost as a foreign tongue."

The Japanese recognized, as have the later totalitarian regimes in Europe, that total control of a population begins with a strait-jacketed educational system. Consequently, one of the first appointments made by the Japanese when they assumed a "protectorate" over Korea in 1905 was that of an educational advisor for the Korean Emperor. In 1908, while Korea was still nominally free, the private schools—numbering 2,200—were all brought under government supervision. By October 1911, the Japanese Governor-General promulgated an ordinance which set forth in detail how and what Koreans were to be taught. A commission was set to work at once re-writing all the textbooks so they would reflect nothing but a Japanese point of view.

The schools for Koreans provide a four- to six-year course. One-third or more of the time is spent in teaching the Japanese language and much of the remaining instruction is given in Japanese. Under the pretext that Koreans had scandalously neglected their own history, the Japanese established in 1925 a Society for Compiling Korean History. By 1937 this Society had published 31 volumes—all devoted to the theme that the Korean people had been helpless and mischievous children, unable to care for themselves until the kindly Japanese came along and were persuaded to lend them a hand. This in Korea now passes for education.

II

In his visit to Korea Peffer was especially interested in the status of the newspapers. Two examples of the many instances he found will illustrate how the Japanese censorship has worked:

"A couple of years ago, *The Christian Messenger*, a missionary weekly, ran an editorial leader on Spring. It was the usual semi-poetic outpouring—how fine was the rebirth of the year when all things are again new and fresh and green and men are heartened anew thereby, etc. The proofs were submitted to the designated official. He came to the leader. His pen paused, suspended in excitement. Ha, ha, said he, Spring, rebirth, new things, ha, ha. Incitement to rebellion, a calling to Koreans to arise and set up a new government! Sedition! Treason! And that issue of the paper was suppressed."

"In a Tract Society pamphlet issued some time ago there appeared a sentence in which all Christian Koreans were adjured to expel the devil from within them. That pamphlet was suppressed with high indignation. Devil? said the official to the editor, devil? When you say devil you are referring to Japan, you are urging Koreans to rise in rebellion! And instructions were then issued to all religious publications never to allow the character for devil to appear in their papers or books again."

Under such conditions Korean journalism could hardly be indiscreet. But the Japanese were nervous. They gradually suppressed every newspaper in Korea except the political journals published in the Japanese language. Then, realizing that they were shutting themselves off from continuous propaganda to the masses, they re-established one newspaper in the Korean language, making it a semi-official organ of the government.

The incident that led to final abolition of all independent Korean newspapers was relatively minor. In 1936 a Korean, Son Gijöng, a student of the Yun-jin High School in Seoul, defeated all Japanese competitors in a race and was made a member of the Olympic team. When, in the contest at Berlin, he won first place, Japan triumphantly announced the victory as a proof of Japanese physical prowess. When Son's picture appeared in Korean newspapers, however, the Japanese flag on his jersey had been blacked out. The enraged authorities jailed the editors and suspended the papers.

III

In addition to their control of the newspapers and periodicals within Korea, the Japanese have successfully influenced views written for publication outside the country.

As the foreigners best informed about Korean conditions, the missionaries have been in a position at least to present the facts to the people outside of Korea. But Japan has held over them, with adroit cunning, a trump card. If any church publication "unfairly misrepresented" the intent of the Japanese in Korea, members of its denomination were thenceforth forbidden to do missionary work in Korea, Japan, or any other Jap-controlled territories. Furthermore, they were absolutely prohibited from discussing any "political questions." Missionary bodies knew well what that prohibition meant.

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the following statement is about as far as any church publication has permitted itself to go: "In the first ten years after annexation, over sixty major changes of policy, touching roughly every phase of life, were put into effect, only to be revised after a year or two." In presenting this statement, the publishers emphasized that no views concerning Japanese

rule could be ascribed to them! The place of publication, incidentally, was not Korea, or Japan, but the United States. Only recently have the missionary societies felt free to express cautiously their real views. And even now they are influenced by their desire to operate again in territory controlled by the Japanese.

IV

In Korea the right of assembly simply does not exist. It is absolutely forbidden for five persons or more to meet together for any purpose whatsoever—even for religious worship or social conversation—without a written permit from the authorities. When, for instance, a group of ten Korean students in Seoul wanted to hold a dinner party in honor of one of their members, a permit had first to be secured, and a Japanese official arrived at the party to sit with the group and take notes on the conversation! This is the procedure which every Korean must accept for all his social, religious, and business meetings.

As for any group or individual whom the Japs have the slightest reason to suspect, the necessary permits are exceedingly hard to secure. Listed as dangerous and subject to constant police espionage, for instance, is any Korean who shows a fondness for reading, or has or endeavors to obtain more than a common school education, who receives foreign publications, who gives any evidence of leadership, or who is looked upon by his fellows with any special regard or respect. "He is a dangerous fellow," say the Japanese. "Watch him. Seize any pretext to lock him up. Beat him down into the level of the masses before he has any chance to rise." And certainly don't give him a permit for holding any kind of meeting!

After the passive revolution of 1919, and the subsequent

storm of world opinion directed against the Japanese excesses, the Japanese Imperial Government undertook a "moderation" of its Korean rule. Baron Saito was appointed as a new Governor-General to put this policy of "moderation" into effect. This is how moderate it was, to cite his own words:

"Freedom of meeting and freedom of expression in meeting will be allowed, but not unrestrictedly. To decide how to regulate these meetings is a delicate matter and requires some investigation. If freedom of speech in Japanese only is what they want, the Government is ready to allow it at any time, but that concession would be meaningless to the Koreans. If they desire the meetings to be conducted in the Korean tongue as well, it will be necessary for the Government, in order to control them, to have qualified officials who thoroughly understand the language."

This, to the Japanese mind, is "moderation." Is it any wonder that the volatile and independent-minded Korean people have resisted the Japanese at every opportunity?

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM OF RELIGION?

Korea is universally known among missionary societies and evangelistic churches as the land in all the Orient most receptive to Christianity. Unfortunately, it is not equally well known that in recent years Korea's Christians have been brutally persecuted and their pastors frequently imprisoned or killed.

Always opposed to Christianity because of its identity with the West and concepts of equality and forbearance, the Japanese have long suspected Korean Christians of leadership in the independence movement and have endeavored to root them out of the country. For somewhat similar reasons they have also attempted to supplant Korea's other religions with fanatic Shintoism. What more could any sensible Korean want than worship of a god so close and tangible as the Emperor and a rule of conduct so princely as *Bushido*? If bamboo rods, swords and shackles have had to be used in effecting the desired conversion of religious belief, that is only because the Koreans have not been fully appreciative of what is best for them. So reasoned the Japanese.

I

The principal religions of the Korean people are Confucianism, Buddhism (with local variants of each), and Christianity. But a negligible few are adherents of Shintoism and the Japanese versions of Buddhism.

The Confucian system of ethics is highly regarded by the great majority. At the present time, Buddhism, which was introduced from China about 370 A.D. and reached its height of influence during the 13th and 14th centuries, is adhered to by about 175,000 Koreans.

It should be noted that many beautiful old Buddhist monasteries still remain in the Diamond Mountains and other areas as a testimonial of the prestige which this religion once enjoyed. Various localized religions have followings of from 10,000 to 80,000 each.

The Protestant Church has about 400,000 followers in Korea as well as 100,000 among the Koreans in Manchuria and Japan. Its following is twice as large as that of the Japanese Christian Church. Roman Catholics in Korea are over 300,000 strong. At one time Korean Christians received guidance and leadership from some 600 foreign missionaries—mostly American; now practically none are left, except for Italian, German, and Irish Catholic priests.

As the foregoing data indicate, Christianity may well be described as the foremost religion in Korea. It is not only strongest in numbers, but also in the enlightenment and leadership which it develops among its adherents. Most of the church groups are led by their own countrymen; still more are self-governing in their church affairs. A large proportion of them maintain their own private schools. Since the doctrines of Christianity are distinctly opposed to the "superior race" concept, to Emperor-worship, and to the

warlike conception of virtue, it is not surprising that Japan has sought to drive it out of Korea.

The Christian religion entered Korea with great difficulty in the days of the country's complete isolationism. The first Bible was brought into Korea in the 18th century. The first missionary to enter the country was Pierre Maubant, a French Catholic priest, in 1835. Six years later an unsuccessful attempt was made to stamp out Catholicism, after which its spread continued relatively unchecked until 1866. In that year a Russian warship appeared at Wonsan and sought to open a trading port. The Korean Regent, in a frenzied attempt to shut out foreign penetration, ordered a wholesale massacre of the Catholics. A few years later, however, the Catholic Mission recovered its influence and by 1882 the principle of complete religious tolerance was firmly established in Korea.

The first Protestant missionary to Korea was Dr. H. N. Allen, a Presbyterian, who entered in 1884. He was followed the next year by two Methodist ministers. Their churches became the leading Protestant denominations in Korea. Although their work was firmly established by the end of the century, their troubles began in 1905, when the Japanese seized political control of Korea.

At the present time there are no Protestant missionaries in Korea—for the first time since 1884. If in China alone there have been more than 800 bombing attacks by the Japanese on Christian missions in the past six years, one can only conjecture what has been done to the 3,000 Christian churches in Korea since the last missionaries were driven out.

However, the Religious Department of the Japanese army would have us believe that it has enlisted fifteen times as many "Christian missionaries" as the total number of Christian ministers and priests ordained in Japan in the past thirty

years. These "Christian missionaries" have been placed in charge of Christian groups deprived of their pastors by death, imprisonment or internment. To all indications, it is their function to interpret Christianity in Shintoist terms and to represent Christ as an Oriental.

II

The first outward attack by the Japanese on the Christians in Korea came in 1912, in what was called "The Christian Conspiracy Case." On a charge of conspiring to assassinate the Governor-General, nine Christians were exiled without trial, three died under torture, and 123 were brought to trial (of whom 106 were sentenced to from five to ten years in prison). The case was thoroughly investigated by American Christian organizations and found to be completely trumped up.

According to detailed evidence compiled by Dr. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, the case was a plot to get rid of the most intelligent and progressive Korean leaders. Dr. Charles W. Eliot, the great educator and President of Harvard, who chanced to be in Japan at the time, came to this conclusion after a personal investigation of the matter: "The standing of Japan among Western nations would be improved by judicious modifications of her preliminary proceedings against alleged criminals." Dr. W. W. Pinson, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, who made a special trip to Korea to investigate the charges, declared that "it is clear that the gendarmes have thrust their sickle in among the tallest wheat. These men [the accused] do not belong to the criminal or irresponsible class of society. . . . These are not the type of men to be guilty of such a plot as that with which they are charged." Protests

did not, however, prevent the Japanese from "liquidating" the Korean leaders.

The next attacks against Christianity in Korea were ideological. Japan sent in her missionaries, ministers of the "Japanese Congregational Church," to proselytize Korean Christians along Shintoist lines. Moreover, a set of "Educational Ordinances" promulgated in 1915 began to undermine the mission schools. Every such school was required to have a Japanese supervisor, and to make detailed daily reports on the work covered. All instruction was to be in the Japanese language. And no new mission school could be opened without a special government permit.

It was with ominous forewarning that Dr. Rentara Midyuro, ex-administrative Superintendent of Korea, declared before a missionary conference held at Pengyang in the spring of 1920: "Critics go even so far as to say that some missionaries in Korea do not in reality consider Korea as an internal part of Japan and Koreans as Japanese subjects, and under the pretext of neutrality in politics, ignore the Japanese sovereignty over Korea." He bluntly stated that "it becomes a serious question for Japan whether she can afford to entrust the education of her young generation to the hands of missionaries." There was no question left in the minds of the assembly as to how much independence they had.

III

The independence movement of 1919 gave the Japanese the opportunity they desired for an all-out attack on Korean Christianity. Sixteen of the thirty-three signers of the Declaration of Independence were Christians. Many of the independence meetings were held in churches. It was easy to represent the whole movement as a Christian plot. And in the violent days of March, the Japs took full advantage of

their opportunity to wage brutal warfare against the Church.

Authentic eyewitness accounts of the atrocities that occurred are quite numerous. But they are too sickening to relate in detail. For a few days the police ran amuck, killing and mutilating the populace, but especially the Christians, with their swords and terrible firehooks. Dozens of tales are told of Koreans repeatedly mutilated to make them renounce their desire for independence; of students tied to trees, beaten into insensibility, then left until they revived and could be beaten again; of young girls knocked down, violated, kicked in the abdomen, and dragged about by the hair. The fate of the tens of thousands who were imprisoned was reminiscent of the records of medieval torture chambers. A report to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions of Canada summed up the situation in these words: "It is a reign of terror; with the Christians as marked men." In all, about 7,000 were killed and 200,000 imprisoned.

A clear picture of what took place in Pengyang alone is to be found in the summary of the annual report for 1918-1919 of an American Presbyterian Mission station. What was observed in that one community in the far north was repeated with even greater severity in the southern portions of Korea, where Japanese residents are more numerous. This is what the report stated:

"To sum up what has been committed against the Church in the Pengyang territory by the police, gendarmes and soldiers, in line with the statements made above, we give the following:

"1. They have arrested many of the leaders of the churches, including pastors, helpers, and school teachers. Many of the rest have fled for safety, for the Church leaders seem to have been singled out for punishment and persecution regardless of guilt or innocence.

"2. They have seriously damaged nineteen church buildings and broken the bell in others.

"3. They have expropriated the property of at least one Church for other purposes without asking for or receiving permission to use the same.

"4. Twenty-six churches have been forced to close for periods up to three months and more.

"5. Many church schools have been forced to close in both city and country, because of the arrest of teachers, for periods up to three months and more.

"6. Helpers, pastors and Bible women have been ordered to stop preaching in many places.

"7. Christian literature has been seized and destroyed in many places.

"8. The police have ordered the non-Christians to drive the Christians out of their homes in several places.

"9. All the students in the Union Christian College and the Boys' Academy in Pengl-yang were ordered arrested by the Chief of Police whether guilty of any offense or not.

"10. Christians have been discriminated against in many ways, of which the following are typical:

"(a) In the special severity shown Christians in connection with the spring 'clean up.'

"(b) In the frequency and severity of beating administered by police in the performance of their official duties.

"(c) In the special effort to arrest and punish the leaders of the churches on the ground that they were *per se* leaders, too, in the independence movement.

"11. Christian women in the country have been terrorized by police, gendarmes and soldiers.

"12. The pastor of the Congregational Church for Koreans (under Japanese control), Mr. Takahashi, has visited certain of our churches and, assisted by police, has forced

Christians to gather and listen to addresses intended to alienate them from the missionaries and their present church connection, and attempted to proselyte for his church. This was done with the knowledge and assistance of petty government officials."

IV

Still another line of attack against the Korean's religious freedom—regardless of whether or not he was a Christian—was instituted more recently. Evidently aware that they could not completely eliminate all "undesirable" religions, the Japanese decided to enforce belief in Shintoism and gradually undermine other influences.

Shinto shrines were erected at crossroads and in parks throughout the country. In addition, it was decreed that all Koreans must declare their reverence for Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, from whom the Japanese Emperors are supposed to have descended. This Shrine worship was made mandatory in all schools conducted for Koreans. In 1938 the Japanese authorities forced the Korean General Assembly to pass a resolution declaring Shrine worship was not inconsistent with Christianity. In 1941 every Korean family was required to erect in its home some kind of Shinto shrine.

Hundreds of Christians who refused to bow before the Shrines are in prison; others have given up all active religious work. In some of the churches, services cannot begin until the oath of allegiance has been repeated in Japanese and the congregation has bowed toward the East. Officially the Church bodies in Korea have been forced to approve Shrine worship and to renounce belief in the concepts of the West.

Christian leaders who have not accepted Shintoism have suffered the severest tortures. Typical is the experience of Kim Yun Sun, an Evangelist who by the age of thirty had

already been imprisoned eight times for denouncing Shrine worship. Under torture he finally agreed that shrine worship was permissible. After his release, however, he repented and informed the police that he held to his original belief.

He was arrested in March, 1940, for the ninth time. After being held incommunicado for eight months, the authorities sent word to his wife that he was dying and that she could take him away. As related by a Korean-born American missionary, Rev. Bruce F. Hunt, "She found him lying outside the prison door on the frozen November ground of early winter in North Manchuria. His jacket had slipped up, bringing his bare skin in touch with the ice, but he was too weak even to pull it down and protect himself." From this experience Kim recovered, only to be arrested for a tenth time and sentenced to sixteen years at hard labor.

v

Even before Pearl Harbor, Protestant missionaries were imprisoned, subjected to dire punishment and driven out of Korea. The Reverend Mr. Hunt, his wife, and Mrs. Roy M. Byram, their companion, were subjected to treatment typical of that received by many. After being arrested, they were separated and kept uninformed of each other. Mr. Hunt was thrown into a cell ten by twenty feet, which already held twenty-five prisoners. Since he could find no room to lie down, he could rest only by leaning against the wall. Among his cell mates were beggars, opium addicts, and bandits, many covered with lice and sores.

When finally brought to trial, Mr. and Mrs. Hunt and their companion were found not guilty of any offense and were ordered to be deported as undesirable aliens. For some reason not explained to them, however, they were again locked up and subjected to "acute mental, spiritual, and phys-

ical testing." Not until six months later were they released and permitted to leave the country.

In a great many respects Christianity in Korea is going through the experiences of the primitive church in the West. However, the teachings of Christ persist. Although lacking the leadership of the missionaries, many Koreans continue to hold fast to their convictions. Fortunately, too, some of the smaller rural churches have managed to survive. And there is reason to believe that many have found ways and means of carrying on their work.

When the war is over and the new Korea arises, it is certain that the Christian nucleus will be in the forefront of a religious revival that will mark the creation of an independent and democratic government. This is the day for which all Korean believers are keeping their faith alive.

CHAPTER VIII

FREEDOM FROM WANT?

Full details on the economic situation in Korea are impossible to secure because Japan has long been notoriously averse to the dissemination of disadvantageous data. Enough is known, however, to indicate the essential character of Japanese exploitation of Korea.

Japan has taken from Korea everything she could get. She has used the land and its inhabitants for her own selfish purposes, without regard to the welfare of the Koreans.

I

Although Japanese constitute two percent of the population of Korea, they comprise over 60 percent of the officials and dominate the economic life of the country.

Although they don't work the land, they have managed to get possession of it. The record shows that 55 percent of the arable soil is farmed by tenants and that most of these are under Japanese landlords. Only one Korean farmer in five owns the land he cultivates. Fifty years ago Japan didn't own a square foot of Korean soil.

Koreans have been reduced to a starvation diet. In 1936-1937, a typical year, almost half the rice grown in Korea was

shipped to Japan, "with great loss to the Korean farmers," as the Japanese Governor-General candidly declared.

Prior to 1905 the Korean Government had never made a public loan. Then, at the suggestion of the Japanese economic advisor, Baron Megata, it borrowed 2,000,000 yen. By September, 1927, the public debt was 298,619,000 yen. By March, 1937, it had further increased to 549,731,000 yen. The bulk of these funds was used to build up a system of military roads and railways to facilitate movement of Japanese troops and supplies.

Eighty-five percent of all capital invested in commerce on the peninsula is owned by Japanese. Almost all trade is with Japan. Since Japan monopolizes the gold mined in Korea and limits money in the peninsula to Bank of Chosen notes, there is no foreign exchange for other trade.

This, Koreans have learned, is what Japan means by her alluring slogans, "Greater Eastern Asia co-prosperity sphere" and "Asia for the Asiatics."

Now let us examine the principal methods and policies by which the impoverishment of the Koreans for Japanese benefit has been achieved. In regard to transportation and communication facilities, the policy has always been—build for the day the army will need them. In regard to manufacturing and commerce, the policy changed in 1931: before that year, there was to be no industrialization of Korea; but after the invasion of Manchuria launched Japan on her new adventure of aggression, war industries have been established. In regard to agriculture, the policy has been to increase production to the maximum and to take as much of it as possible from the Koreans.

II

Food, the fundamental economic consideration for any

people, is the only meaningful measurement of living standards in the Orient.

To all clear indications the Korean people have been systematically starved by the Japanese. Throughout the peninsula 85 percent of the family income is spent for food. More than half of the food consumed daily is rice; the rest is a dreary combination of millet, soybeans, buckwheat, sorghum, sweet potatoes, and corn. As for other vegetables, fruit, milk, meat, and dairy products, these are not even listed in the consumption tables.

The Korean people do not get the food their labor produces. Of the 250,000,000 bushels of rice produced annually, 45 percent is exported to Japan. Although fishing along the 10,000 miles of coastline of the peninsula and its 200 islands is very good, the natives do not benefit thereby. Fishing for oneself is prohibited. Fishing for Japan is mandatory. The fishermen are required to turn over their catch to the authorities.

Japanese-owned companies dominating the fishing industry are concentrated in the larger ports. Virtually all sardines, crab-meat, oysters, clams, and dried and salted fish obtained from Korean waters are exported as Japanese property.

The struggle for sustenance leaves the Koreans little time, energy, or opportunity for other occupations.

III

How did over half the farm land come so quickly into Japanese possession? Surely not by normal processes of barter and sale. It should be remembered that Korea is and has been predominantly an agricultural country. The people have always lived on and from the land. Losing it is one of the worst tragedies that could occur to them.

Before annexation, the land in Korea was divided into four classes: (1) Private lands owned by individuals. (2) Royal lands, owned by the King, but leased in perpetuity to private individuals who had the right of passing it on to their heirs or selling it. (3) Municipal lands, with titles belonging to municipalities but similarly leased to individuals who were the practical owners. (4) Lands belonging to Buddhist temples, and operated communally by the Buddhists.

Upon annexation, the Japanese Government took over all Royal, municipal, and Buddhist lands—on the pretext that they had no private ownership—dispossessed the Korean farmers and turned them over to Japanese immigrants on an easy-purchasing plan. Those who protested were shot.

Another means of seizing the land was highly effective. The fertile rice fields of the South are irrigated by running water from one field to another. The Oriental Development Company could—and did—secure by guile, force, or purchase at any price the upper field of an irrigation system, cut off the water supply, and then buy at ruinous prices the lands they had rendered worthless.

By such means two million Koreans have been forced off their own land. Of those who have not been evicted from their homes over 50 percent have become tenants—most of them of Japanese landlords.

An even worse aspect of the plight of the farmers is revealed by the large numbers of them who have been forced into a wandering existence, into scratching out their livelihoods haphazardly—by burning brush off a section of barren hilltops and getting a crop or two before erosion and exhaustion of the poor soil forces them to move on. A sufficient commentary on this situation is a frank description of it in the annual report by the Governor-General of Korea for 1936-37:

"At present there are about forty thousand families of two hundred thousand persons working in the cultivation of 'fire fields' in the mountainous districts. These poor people are driven by hunger from place to place, making shelters in log cabins and keeping their bodies and souls together by planting grains and vegetables on the hillsides. Their methods are to set fire to State forests in order to open up fields before sowing seed."

IV

Japan's economic policy in Korea before 1931 was two-fold: (1) to make of it a source of raw materials for her own manufacturing, and (2) to use it as a dumping ground for her surplus industrial products. For both reasons, she was determined not to permit the industrialization of Korea. The real wealth of the country—iron, magnesium, gold, coal, the best of its food supplies—was steadily sucked out and in "payment" for it there flowed in a stream of cheap and shoddy merchandise constituting household equipment which the Korean people are not allowed to manufacture for themselves. This is the basic economic situation created by the Japanese colonial system.

A principal instrument in creating it has been the Oriental Development Company. This organization was chartered by Japan on August 26, 1908, while Korea was still a protectorate. Its president and two-thirds of its directors are required to be Japanese. The amount of its stock owned by Koreans may never exceed thirty percent of the total. The headquarters of the firm are in Japan. At the time of its incorporation, its capital stock was set at \$5,000,000, of which \$1,500,000 was provided by a forced grant of the government-owned cultivated lands of Korea. Its purpose was to assist in the development of agriculture and manufacturing

by the granting of loans primarily to Japanese immigrants. Its practical effect has been to extend gradually its ownership or control over most aspects of Korea's economic life not otherwise controlled and to establish discriminatory business regulations favoring the Japanese.

Since its founding the Oriental Development Company has steadily increased its capital stock. Its ownership of land and natural resources has constantly expanded. The funds and property it accumulates are Korean. But ownership and control remain Japanese.

v

A glance at the map of Korea will show a fairly well developed network of rail lines and highways—all designed to facilitate Japanese purposes.

Most of these rail lines and highways have been built by Korean labor at meager wages and under enforced conditions. A Japanese foreman rounds up all the men in a designated village, and requires them to work a set period of time on the road or rail bed. To escape this slavery, a Korean has to pay, for each day he does not work, twice the wages he would have received.

The highways and railroads are paid for by Korean taxes. The Japanese plausibly have explained that since the facilities are in Korea, they should be financed by Koreans. They have not explained that the decision to build them was theirs and they have been designed and used primarily for Japanese military purposes.

The first railways in Korea were built by Americans and supplied with American rolling stock. Now they are owned by the Japanese Government and supplied from the South Manchurian Railway plants.

VI

The first bank to be established in Korea was the Fusan Branch of the First Bank of Japan. It was set up in 1878. The next banks opened were branches of two other Japanese banking houses. Those few Korean banks which managed to come into existence from time to time were merged in 1918 into the Industrial Bank of Chosen, under the strict regulation of the government. Since then the flow of capital in Korea has been controlled by the Japanese Governor-General.

One of the more amazing aspects of this control is a law prohibiting any Korean from drawing money out of his bank account without written permission from the government. The effect of this law has been, of course, to handicap Koreans in doing business in competition with Japanese. The following story, related by a foreign automobile dealer formerly in Korea, typifies the situation: A Korean planned to institute a private bus service between his village and the railway station thirty miles or so away. He went to the dealer to negotiate for a bus, paid a deposit, and awaited its arrival. When the dealer notified him the bus had arrived, he sought to draw out money from his account to purchase it. The police, however, refused to permit him to do so. Shortly thereafter, the bus service he had envisaged was established—by a Japanese.

By such methods as this, and by the persistent influence of centralized and prejudiced financial control, there has been a steady shift of ownership of Korean property to the Japanese. The entire output of the gold mines, for instance, has been taken by the Japanese at prices arbitrarily set 30 or 40 percent below the world price. All new developments requiring large amounts of capital, such as hydro-electric power

stations, have necessarily been in the hands of the Japanese. And the most basic and valuable properties in Korea, the agricultural lands, have steadily drifted into Japanese ownership.

VII

Manufacturing in Korea consists primarily of two types: heavy industries, devoted principally to war production, which were installed after 1931; and handicraft work in homes or small shops. Home products comprised 25 percent of total manufacturing in 1912, but had risen to more than 40 percent in 1923. Latterly they have declined. In 1912 Korea contained 328 manufacturing plants, which engaged five or more workers. Under the stimulus of World War I, this number increased to 2,384 plants by 1921. The present war has resulted in the complete conversion of Korean plants to war production. The number of companies engaged in industry and manufacture in 1936 was 2,000; at this time 6,000 plants were in operation. In 1938 Koreans owned only 11 percent of their country's corporate capital.

✓ Since 1911 all business and industry in Korean has been strictly regulated. No new business of any kind has been able to come into being without a license from the authorities. For a time after the revolution of 1919 the restrictions were relaxed, but the invasion of Manchuria brought with it tightened controls.

The Japanese attitude toward the role of the Koreans in the development of manufacturing is revealed in this blunt statement in *Chosen of Today*, an official pamphlet published in 1929: "The Koreans are a deft race, and their mats, ceramics, and other wares are by no means despicable!" The relative importance of manufacturing in Korea may be adjudged by the fact that the 225-page annual report of 1936-

37 devotes only four pages to it—two of them comprising a historical review.

The position of Koreans in the economy of the country is further indicated by the double standard maintained for working conditions and wages. In general, all the hardest and most unpleasant jobs are assigned to the Koreans; all the pleasant and higher paid jobs go to the Japanese. And even when they do the same work, the wages are widely divergent. Information on this point is very difficult of access, but the following table of wage scales for a selected group of skilled occupations is indicative:

	<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Koreans</i>
Stone Mason	1.96 yen per day	1.02 yen per day
Plasterer	1.54 yen per day	.96 yen per day
Carpenter	1.44 yen per day	1.00 yen per day
Bricklayer	1.40 yen per day	1.00 yen per day
Blacksmith	1.20 yen per day	.60 yen per day
Compositor80 yen per day	.45 yen per day
Brewer (incl. board)	16.00 yen per mo.	7.00 yen per mo.

The Governor-General's annual reports also show that wage increases consistently have lagged behind price increases. Since the Japanese pay lower prices on the average and receive higher wages, the real disparity for Koreans is much greater than the record shows. The reports, using 1910 as the base, show increases for 1934 of wages to 149.46 and prices to 162.33; for 1935 of wages to 152.46 and prices to 179.58; and for 1936 of wages to 161.15 and prices to 190.62.

VIII

The restoration of a stable and equitable economic system in Korea will be one of the major postwar problems. For the

Provisional Republic of Korea, the economic question has been a continuing concern.

The head of the Korean Commission in Washington and first President of the Korean Republic-in-Exile, Dr. Syngman Rhee, has announced the following six points as constituting his government's economic charter for postwar settlement:

(1) Restoration of lands: break-up of the large Japanese-owned farms, and redistribution of the land among the people in 10-12 acre plots.

(2) Restoration of a Korean financial system based on a gold reserve reclaimed from Japan.

(3) Abolition and abrogation of Japanese restrictions throttling the fisheries, silk and manufacturing industries.

(4) Repatriation of Korean railways. Development of the present military highway system into roadways for civilian travel and commerce.

(5) Repeal of restrictions on home butchery, and all other laws requiring export of major portions of foodstuffs to Japan.

(6) Education of Koreans in modern mechanics and engineering. Importation from the United States of machine tools, petroleum products, machinery, automobiles and other vehicles, railway equipment and supplies, drugs, books, telephone and radio equipment, and all sorts of modern appliances.

Under a free economy, governed by laws of their own making, and relieved of the sucking tentacles of a hypocritical colonial policy, the Korean people look forward to a post-war prosperity commensurate with their abilities and resources.

CHAPTER IX

FREEDOM FROM FEAR?

While the railway bridge at Pengyang was under construction, a Korean boatman attempted to go under it. This was forbidden, but there was no sign to that effect. He was seized by the Japanese and hurled into the water. When he attempted to save his life by clinging to floating timbers, his hands were mutilated until he drowned. When his father took the matter up with the Japanese authorities, he was told they were without jurisdiction over the case.

When a railway station was opened in an out-of-the-way village, an old man hobbled toward the platform out of curiosity. A half-naked Japanese employee of the railroad grasped the aged Korean by the beard and threw him onto the platform. As he arose and groped for his cane, the Japanese threw him off the platform onto the tracks.

Several Japanese soldiers entered a Korean shop and asked the elderly proprietor for some merchandise. To their objections to the price he politely suggested that they try another shop. For this "presumption" he was knocked down, repeatedly kicked and left for dead. Although a Japanese policeman, standing on the corner, clearly knew what was going on, he made no move to interfere.

I

These are representative samples of the dozens of eyewitness stories told by Americans and other impartial observers of the reign of terror which the Japanese have maintained in Korea ever since they assumed a "protectorate" over it.

The world has latterly become surfeited with tales of brutalism and sadism, and with instances of pillage, rape, and destruction. We have read of them till they have little meaning to us any more. Such, however, is not true of the people who are forced to endure the savagery of which we only read. Lashings, mutilation, and wanton cruelty never lose their shuddering poignancy for those who must undergo the tortures. Indeed, a burned child dreads fire, and suffers from apprehension as well as from the burns, if he knows they are inevitable. This is the greatest tragedy of Korea: its people live in a terror they cannot mitigate nor escape.

One Korean in every ten has fled to the hills and slipped across the border into Manchuria to find temporary surcease from oppression. But, sooner or later, he is seized in Manchuria. Some few have tried to escape their lot by accepting assimilation into the Japanese pattern, but their conquerors' suspicions are hard to lull. And for the majority which insists on being Korean still, there is no security, no peace, no freedom from fear.

Although they are one of the most peace-loving peoples in the world, they are whipped and terrorized into submission. It is no wonder that they have become sly, and shrewder, more determined and more ruthless in resistance to Japanese brutality.

II

For all practical purposes, every Japanese soldier, gendarme, and policeman in Korea continues to exercise the right

of "summary judgment" at his own discretion. That is, he can arrest, try, and punish, even to death, any Korean on the spot where his "crime" was committed.

Theoretically, the privilege of "summary judgment" was surrendered in 1920. In effect, it never has been given up. The Japanese have always exercised the right of conquerors to deal with the subjugated populace as they saw fit.

It is impossible to enumerate the cases of summary judgment. Very seldom are any reports made or records kept. And the term is so broad as to be all but indefinable. It covers and exonerates the Japanese who kills a Korean or who merely pushes one out of his way; who cuffs an old man, or who rapes a young girl; who beats a farmer or who takes food from his wife. The Japanese soldiers who beat the Korean shopkeeper were "legitimately" maintaining the price ceiling. Those who drowned the Pengyang boatman undoubtedly exceeded their rights, but the officials who refused to punish them were legally exercising their right of summary judgment in the case.

III

Theoretically the right of summary judgment is supposed to be exercised only when the public welfare demands immediate punishment of the "criminal." In practice it is suspended only when the arresting official wishes to extend the punishment beyond the resources at his immediate command. In such circumstances the Koreans are arrested and taken to court. They are even given the form of a trial, but are practically never found innocent. A few statistics cited from the court records of the annual reports of the Governor-General of Korea will reveal the facts. These figures, we must bear in mind, are official data published by the Japanese themselves. They include only the cases which are taken to court,

exclusive of the hundreds of thousands that are decided and punished on the spot.

The total number of "criminal" cases decided during 1912 reached 21,483, being an increase of 2,586 over that of the previous year. Of the persons implicated in these cases, 433 were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment with hard labor, 34 to imprisonment only, 5,736 to a minor fine, 1,807 to police detention, 9,705 to a police fine, 18,438 to flogging and 800 were acquitted, making a total of 36,953 persons.

The total number of "criminal" cases decided during 1914 reached 32,333, involving 50,105 offenders, an increase of 2,486 cases over 1913. Of the accused implicated in these cases, 48,763 persons were sentenced, 71 proved their innocence, and 21 were pardoned.

The number of "criminal" cases decided during 1915 reached 41,236, involving 60,371 offenders, an increase of 8,956 cases over 1914. Of the persons implicated in these cases, 59,436 were sentenced, 40 proved their innocence, and 7 were pardoned.

The "criminal" cases tried during 1916 totalled 56,013, involving 82,121 offenders, of whom 81,139 were sentenced, 30 proved their innocence, and the remaining 952 were pardoned.

In 1920 the courts tried 188,762 "criminal" cases—reflecting the aftermath of the 1919 passive revolution. This amounted to one Korean in every 100—including men, women, and children—a significant commentary on the severity of the measures invoked to keep the Korean nationalists under control.

The number of Koreans arrested in 1935 was 206,214, and the regular police force of 19,409 was augmented by an auxiliary force of 200,000 men.

The Governor-General's report states that more than 47,217 "criminal" cases were tried during 1936.

Unmistakably clear from the foregoing figures is the fact that the so-called court trials are only a mechanism for delivering the arrested wretch to his destined punishment. Under the Japanese judicial system his guilt need not be proved and it is all but impossible for him to demonstrate his innocence. The word of the arresting official is always the paramount evidence considered. Frequently a "confession" is extorted even before the "trial" is called. In the dungeons where preliminary "examinations" are held, beating with sharp-cornered triangular bamboo rods is the favorite persuasion used, but in stubborn cases oiled paper is fastened about the arm and burned, slivers are driven under the finger nails, and other devices too horrible for description are resorted to.

v

There has been a steady succession of what the Japanese call "incidents" ever since the annexation of Korea. The most despicable of these was the massacre of 5,000 to 9,000 Koreans by the Japanese at the time of the Tokyo earthquake in September, 1923.

Americans remember the earthquake primarily as the time in which we generously came to the aid of the Japanese populace. Our money and food saved them from exposure and hunger; our medicine rescued them from disease; our architects planned for them a new city which could not so easily be destroyed. Articles sympathetic to the Japanese appeared in newspapers all over America, and helped to create the veil of sympathy which hid from our eyes the preparations for war the Japanese were even then making in the islands of the Pacific.

But Koreans remember the earthquake of 1923 for another reason. Scarcely before the shocks of the quake had ceased, the panicky Japanese spread the false rumor that Korean immigrants in Tokyo were looting, burning houses, and poisoning the wells. Crowds of rioters swooped down upon the Korean settlements. They were spurred on by an official appeal from the Tokyo Chief of Police, urging the people to "use all necessary measures" to subdue the Koreans.

Organized squads began the massacre. Many Koreans were slowly tortured to death, while crowds stood about, applauding. In Tokyo 800 Koreans were invited to military headquarters for protection and there every one of them was slain. Osaka and Nagoya were other centers of the slaughter. On September 5 the government ordered the blood bath stopped. Needless to say, there was no punishment for the Japanese, but 100,000 Koreans were driven from their homes, had their property confiscated and were deported to Korea.

In 1929 a nation-wide demonstration of students broke out in Korea in protest against the treatment Korean girls received from Japanese. For several months these disturbances spread through the country. Thousands of Korean students were rounded up, imprisoned, and beaten.

In 1932 eight secret nationalist organizations in Korea united in a program of protest meetings and independence demonstrations. Three years later six secret organizations staged similar disturbances. By 1936 all Korean nationalist groups within the country were united into two bodies, which directed extensive independence demonstrations. In all of these instances, large numbers of Koreans were arrested and punished.

Although spies are everywhere, meetings are prohibited,

and private correspondence is censored, the organizations are maintained and the disturbances go on.

In the mountains of northern Korea and in Manchuria, tens of thousands of Korean nationalists are joined together in guerrilla bands. The Japanese call them bandits. They list evidence of thousands of Korean raids on supply dumps and transportation and communication facilities every year. It is the best of evidence that the Koreans' determination to be free has never weakened and will not die.

VI

Assassination, as such, must always be deplored by civilized people. We cannot approve the murder of public officials by groups of private individuals no matter how just their grievances against the Government those officials represent. We must keep this fact in mind when we appraise the systematically organized, carefully directed, and continuously practiced assassination of Japanese officials by Korean patriots. The Korean people, however, are proud of these assassinations and of the skill with which they are carried out. They reason as follows:

"If Allied troops were able to kill Hitler or any of his chief aids, that would be considered a brilliant military achievement. The assassination of Japanese by Koreans is the same sort of act of war. Our Emperor was forced to abdicate and the Japanese seized our country. We have never acquiesced in their annexation of Korea. Our 'Righteous Army' fought until it was annihilated. Our people rebelled as soon as they could and, to give formal expression to their rebellion, they set up an independent Government-in-exile.

This Government has been at war with Japan ever since, seeking by every means in its power to win the independence which it has proclaimed."

Assassination is one of the principal methods the Koreans have been able to use. And it has been effective. When ex-Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who negotiated the treaty of non-aggression with Russia, was on his way home from Geneva after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, he was asked whether he did not fear Chinese assassins. "The only terrorists we Japanese officials are afraid of are the Koreans," he replied. The record justifies the fear.

The Eui Yul Tan is the principal secret society devoted to the liquidation of Japanese authorities. Its membership extends into every one of the 360 districts of Korea. Nowhere in the country is there a Japanese official who is out of danger.

Training in sabotage and assassination is given in Korean "Academies" located in Siberia, China, and, formerly, Manchuria. Graduates of these schools have carried out thousands of attacks, many on leading Japanese officials. Assaults on the Emperor, on Baron Tanaka, author of Japan's blueprint for conquest, and on Baron Saito, Governor-General of Korea, were the most notable "near misses." Assassination of Prince Ito in 1909 and of several of the leading Japanese Generals in 1932 were the most outstanding successes.

VII

In a sense, freedom from fear is sought not only by Koreans themselves, but also by the Japanese in their midst. Terrorism extends in both directions. There are two essential and highly significant differences, however:

✓ (1) The Koreans are living at home—except for those forced into exile—and are simply trying to free themselves from foreign oppression; the Japanese are invaders, seeking to exploit and rule a conquered people.

(2) The Koreans must fight without weapons, without opportunity for any but clandestine and highly dangerous meet-

ings to work out plans, without free communication, and without any but outside or anonymous leaders; the Japanese rule them with every resource of a totalitarian government.

Until the war is ended, the Koreans are content to live without freedom from fear. Although Japan has disarmed them to the extent that there remains in Korea only one kitchen knife for every three families, the Koreans have fought, are fighting, and will continue to fight till their four freedoms have been won. The opportunity to fight as partners in a common cause is the most that their leaders have asked.

PART THREE

Resurrection

CHAPTER X

THE PRESENT

The Korean people are today less concerned with the past than with the present and future. They are confident that their country will soon be free, that the oppression and misery of the past will soon be over.

But they realize that the road ahead is far from smooth. They recognize that the difficulties which have inevitably arisen from the separation of their leaders from their native land may handicap the efforts of the Provisional Government in the direction of Korea's participation in the war and in the restoration of Korean independence. They recognize, too, that it will by no means be a simple matter to replace overnight the Japanese exploitation system with a sound and stable democratic society. They are well aware that the process will be accompanied by drastic upheavals and that grave economic, social, and political problems will confront them. Nevertheless they face the future with optimism and patriotic zeal—determined to make Korea a free and happy land. The staggering problems of reconstruction are infinitely preferred by them to the miseries they have endured during their fifty years of war with Japan.

II

The entry of the United States into the war against Japan in December, 1941, naturally aroused the Korean hope for early restitution of independence. The political consequences were two-fold. The prospect of being able to reenter their country within a few years stirred up afresh all the latent rivalries and clashes of policy of existing Korean partisans. And it served to arouse the ambitions of self-seeking opportunists who hoped to establish themselves as outstanding spokesmen for their country and thus be entitled to positions of power when the post-war government is set up.

As a result of this situation, there are today three types of groups professing to speak for Korea: the Provisional Government, led by prominent members of what was once the prosperous upper middle class; the Communists, led by Koreans who had emigrated to Siberia; and miscellaneous individuals who have little in common except that they are exceedingly vocal and represent self-created organizations. But if the latter can be ignored, the Provisional Government and the Communists cannot.

After the Mansei Revolution of March 1919, the Korean independence movement was solidly united for a period of about six years. In 1919, envoys were sent by the Provisional Government to the Paris Peace Conference; in April the Korean Commission was established in Washington and diplomatic recognition was sought, unsuccessfully, from the leading governments; and in 1923 a delegation presented the case for Korea at the Washington Disarmament Conference. After that, the various positive steps the Provisional Government could take were limited to appeals for world sympathy and understanding. All diplomatic channels were blocked, as the countries of the West were determined to

live at peace with Japan and considered the question of Korea's status closed.

Gradually, divisions began to appear among the Korean leaders. Some wanted to launch their guerrilla fighters from the Manchurian hills into Korea in a bloody attempt to drive the Japanese out. Officers of the Provisional Government preferred the slower course of appealing to public opinion in America and Europe. In consequence, various groups were formed and the Provisional Government's authority began to disintegrate. In 1926 the leaders of all the groups met in Shanghai determined to erase their differences and reestablish a common front. A joint declaration of united support for the Provisional Government was drawn up and issued. Lacking, however, any program of action upon which all could agree, this declaration was soon forgotten.

For the next six or eight years there was no spokesman for Korea who had sufficiently wide support to win the allegiance of all groups. The Provisional Government continued to meet regularly in Shanghai, a growing Communist influence began to spread out of Siberia into Manchuria and Korea, and Syngman Rhee continued to represent his government through the Korean Commission and his contacts with the Cabinet and National Assembly in Shanghai.

III

In 1932 there came a new fusion of the divergent groups. Provisional Government broadened its base to take in all of the radical leaders. A combination of diplomatic and revolutionary activities was worked out. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Rhee went to Geneva to raise the Korean question in connection with the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, but the League refused to act on the Manchurian issue, de-

spite the strong representations of American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson.

At about the same time a program of direct action was put into effect by the Provisional Government. Korean guerrilla activities were intensified and a series of assassination attempts upon Japanese officials was carried out.

The year 1932 marked a turning point in the history of the Korean revolutionary movement. Ever since then there has been a general acceptance by all responsible groups of the authority of the Provisional Government, and, concurrently, a growing internal struggle for control of that Government by radical and conservative groups. In July, 1936, a new declaration of unity was signed by representatives of all Korean parties, and a consolidated Cabinet was formed—with Kim Koo as Chairman and Syngman Rhee as President and Chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States.

The balance of power within both the Cabinet and the National Assembly has been disturbed, however, ever since the United States was precipitated into the war and eventual defeat of Japan became assured. Although Kim Koo resigned in the summer of 1943, he was prevailed upon by all the partisan groups to withdraw his resignation. This new evidence of unity represented the conviction of every responsible leader that Korea must have but one spokesman in its dealings with the Allied nations.

IV

This does not mean, however, that all divisions have been erased. J. Kiusic Kimm and Kim Yak-san, the chief opponents of the Independent Party leadership of the Provisional Korean Government, are in the Cabinet and continue their efforts to control it. While Kim Koo is an exceedingly able

and thoroughly patriotic executive, he lacks the type of diplomatic adroitness needed to balance factions against one another in order to achieve a workable combination. Consequently, despite the majority of the conservatives in the National Assembly, the radicals are securing acceptance of more and more of their program.

The big struggle is for the adherence of the Korean masses, who cannot now make their wishes known. Those in Siberia have long been friendly toward Russia not because of belief in the Communist ideology, but because the possibility of a clash between Russia and Japan offered them the best hope for freedom.

It is generally believed that the rising Communist influence has been offset by the support given by Chiang Kai-shek to the leaders of the Provisional Government. During his long struggle to prevent the Bolshevization of China, he and the Korean Provisional Government have stood staunchly together. They have much in common today.

Korean partisans have fought side by side with the Chinese in the battles to protect Manchuria in 1931 and in the fighting in China since 1937. Korean guerrillas are supplied chiefly from Chinese bases and their activities are integrated with plans of the Chinese general staff. The present Korean army, which at one time numbered 35,000 men, is aligned with Chinese army units, having its headquarters at Chungking. The Chinese Government has for years given *de facto* recognition to the Korean Provisional Republic and has contributed up to 150,000 Chinese dollars per month to its support.

It would be idle to pretend that there are no divisions among Koreans. But it cannot be denied that the Provisional Government is the authentic official representative—with a continuous and frequently recognized line of authority run-

ning back to the Revolution of 1919—of the Korean people. The first fact is of distinctly less significance than the second. Divisions among all peoples are inevitable— and they have been intensified, nay invited, by refusal of the Great Powers to make a decision regarding recognition of the Provisional Government. The significant fact is that despite the divisive tendencies, the Provisional Government has had for 25 years, and still does have the adherence of every responsible Korean group.

CHAPTER XI

THE FUTURE

The principal pressing problems confronting the Provisional Government are: (1) to secure recognition by the United States and other countries; (2) to be admitted to the councils of the United Nations; (3) to obtain Lend-Lease supplies; and (4) to integrate the guerrilla and sabotage activities of its underground movement into the plans of the Allied high command.

To avoid offending Japan, recognition of the Provisional Government was refused all through the 1920's and 1930's. The policy of the Western nations was to seek the maintenance of peace in the Pacific by permitting Japan to realize its imperialist ambitions. In pursuing this policy, the United States let Japan have and fortify the Pacific islands; seize and develop the military resources of Manchuria; attack China with the continuous aid of our scrap metal, oil, and other supplies; and maintain its suzerainty over Korea.

After the outbreak of war with Japan, recognition of Korea seemed unwise to some officials of our State Department because of possible offense to Russia. While the Russian armies were bearing the brunt of the European war and while Stalin was clearly indicating his intention of incorporating a bastion

of border states into the Soviet Union, it seemed inadvisable to extend recognition to the government of a country Russia might want to take over. The Cairo Declaration, evidently made with Stalin's approval, appears to have settled this issue.

Another reason for withholding recognition of the Korean Provisional Government—one that could be publicly stated—has been the assertion that the Korean people are incapable of self-government. Those who have made this assertion have pointed out that Japan has kept the masses uneducated, that it has perverted their thinking with systematic misinformation, and that it has prevented the development of native leadership. However, the Korean people insist that they are fully capable of assuming the responsibilities of government for these reasons:

(1) The Korean system of village government, like that of China, has been one of democratic self-government for hundreds of years.

(2) The majority of the Korean Christians have been receiving training in parliamentary procedure and in democratic self-government through their church organizations.

(3) Through sheer necessity, large numbers of Koreans have been given technical training in the various administrative branches of the government under the Japanese. The governors of provinces, the heads of departments, etc., have all been Japanese, but the Communications Bureau, the Railroad Bureau, the Educational Department, Department of Forestry and Mines, etc., and even the police, have been partly staffed by Koreans.

II

Integration of Korean military leadership into the strategy of the United Nations would seem to have self-evident

values. The advisability of establishing Korea as a fighting ally might be summed up simply on these grounds:

(1) Prestige value among Orientals of having the active support of a population that has supposedly been amalgamated with the Japanese.

(2) Military value of effectively activating 30 million inhabitants of a country which sits astride Japan's most vital supply routes and which occupies a position close to her home centers.

(3) Moral value of proving the sincerity of the Atlantic Charter and its application to the Pacific in time to win the support of peoples still doubtful as to the intent of the Allied Powers.

There is much that Koreans have already done and much more that they can do. Japan's military supplies for her war on China and for a possible war with Russia must move principally through Korea. And the rail lines on which they move go through 20 tunnels, across numerous trestles, under overhanging cliffs of Korea's precipitous mountains, and across several bridges. Needless to say, these supply lines are exceedingly vulnerable. Koreans who are on the spot, who have been Japanized in language and dress, and who understand the psychology of their overlords as only a conquered people can learn it, are ideally suited to undermine those routes.

Spokesmen for the Provisional Government estimate that 10,000 guerrillas—well-led, well-supplied, and participating in Allied strategy—could throw the whole Japanese military systems of Korea and Manchuria into a state of irreparable confusion. What this would mean to an Allied naval, air, and army force moving in for the final attack requires no elaboration.

The essentials are *integration of plans, trained leadership,*

and *supplies*. All of these are dependent upon recognition ✓ and acceptance of the Korean government by the United Nations.

III

The rehabilitation and reconstruction problems confronting Korea are perhaps more serious than those facing any other of the nations. It is enduring the results not of a four or five year war, but of fifty years of struggle. Its territory has been occupied and its population exploited for more than a full generation. Its people have been subjected to misinformation and distortion of facts not since 1939 (as in occupied Europe), or 1933 (as in Nazi Germany)—but since the very establishment of its newspapers at the turn of the century.

The post-war Korean situation will be an unhappy illustration of Matthew Arnold's lines:

“For we are hovering between two worlds;
“One dead, the other struggling to be born.”

✓ Only yesterday Korea was a feudal society. Tomorrow it will use the conveniences of modern civilization on a large scale. Today it is a hodge-podge of the old and the new.

The transition to a modern economic and social system will not be easy. The people have unquestionably suffered moral, occupational and intellectual debasement which will be difficult to overcome. Korea will sorely need all the leadership of its exiled citizens as well as the investment of capital and provision of business management by outside interests.

The resources of Korea are such as to provide considerable incentive for foreign investors and industrialists. A mere listing of some of the areas of development, with their facili-

ties, will indicate the nature of the tasks and the opportunities to be found:*

Minerals of many kinds are very abundant. Iron is mined in considerable quantities especially in the middle north. Gold is found in nearly all sections of the north and south, both in the sands of the valleys and in the deep rocky deposits of mountains. Gold-mining has been one of the most profitable of all businesses carried on in Korea. Most of the deep mines have been developed by foreign companies; American firms have been most successful in this connection.

Coal is found in large quantities both soft and hard, though up to this time most of the mining has been done near the surface where soft coal is most common. Iron is also found in paying quantities but most of the mining for this has been done near the surface and much mixed with soils. Silver and copper are found in fair quantities. In the southern sections tungsten is found and during the last great war much, perhaps most, of the tungsten used was obtained from there. In recent years very large magnesium deposits have been found on the northeast coast at Hamheung in the province of Hamkyung.

Korea is very well provided with water power for electrical generation. More than 800,000 kw. is now utilized, 80 per cent of which is derived from hydro-electric plants. Another 600,000 to 700,000 kw. hydro-electric plant is now in the process of building. A survey of Korean water power has shown that there still are over one hundred sites for hydro-electric plants capable of generating more than 2,000,000 kw.

It will be seen, therefore, that the country is due for wide use of electrical current, for domestic consumption, industrial

*The reports of O. R. Avison, who spent most of his life in Korea, were of considerable assistance in the preparation of this section.

use, and for transportation. Even at the present time, high tension (110,000-150,000 volt) transmission lines carry the current from Chang Jin Hydro-electric Projects, 150 to 200 miles, to supply the cities of Pengyang and Seoul.

New equipment requirements to utilize all this power will include: sub-station equipment, panels, transformers, switchboards and heavy-transmission line equipment. In the way of domestic and industrial needs, there would be considerable demand for meters (very few are now furnished to domestic consumers); appliances, such as fans, irons, stoves and heaters, etc., would be required for domestic use, while motors, fractional horsepower as well as heavy duty, single and three-phase, arc-welding, traveling crane and other industrial equipment such as switches, circuit breakers, condensers, coils, and especially wiring of all types, would be necessary.

There are in Korea about 14,000 miles of motor highways, less than 200 of which are paved or surfaced in any way. However, these are traversed by busses and trucks the year round. With the program of improving the highways projected for after-war Korea, keen demand for motor vehicles will exist. With the lifting of restrictions to owner-operation of motor cars now prevailing, more individuals will no doubt purchase personal motor cars, and thus increase the transportation facilities of the country in general.

It is expected that no less than 10,000 to 15,000 units, mostly truck chassis, will be imported, and perhaps 5,000 motorcycles. While most of the truck chassis would be used for hauling freight and passengers (very few for dump and dirt hauling, except for the purpose of road-making) the bodies for ordinary freight trucks and passenger busses will probably be made in Korea, in view of the heavy first cost and freight from the United States. Considerable experience has been acquired by the Koreans in this type of work. It is

not likely that Korea would go in for motor-car construction to any extent other than perhaps the assembling of certain units. Accordingly, all the accessories and gadgets for the automotive industry would be required.

There are approximately 3,400 miles of standard gauge railways in Korea in operation and some 500 to 800 miles more in the process of construction. Besides this, there are over a thousand miles of narrow-gauge railway serving communities of considerable importance. Eventually, these narrow-gauge roads will be converted into the standard track and equipment.

The first railways in Korea were built by American capitalists and engineers, and the rolling stock as well as track material were mostly of American manufacture. For some years additions to track and equipment were purchased from the United States, but of late they were supplied by the local shops and from the South Manchurian Railway plants. After the war a great part of this equipment will be worn out and obsolete, since much of the motive power and passenger coaches have been in use since the beginning of the century.

While it may be the intention of the Koreans to develop their transportation system through a network of highly-developed high-speed highways, yet the efficient operation of the present railways for heavy traffic must be kept in mind. Accordingly, immediate need for heavier types of rolling stock, shop equipment, signaling systems (switches, etc.) would be required.

There are approximately 3,000,000 farm families in Korea, with an average of three acres to a family. The arable land is therefore divided into very small parcels—not more than five hundred farms are fifty acres or more. Accordingly, no large demand for power-driven or animal-drawn implements can be expected.

With the industrialization of the country to a certain ex-

tent using the marginal and surplus farm labor, it is expected that considerable acreage, especially of the upland farms, will be combined to make larger fields, to be tended by fewer people. When this situation comes to pass, a reasonable amount of comparatively light farm implements will be required. Because of the considerable need for small irrigation projects, flood control, and prevention of alluvial erosion in a mountainous country such as Korea, there will be great need for earth-moving and rock-crushing machinery. No individual or even village would be in a position to purchase these, but it seems reasonable to expect that a combination of communities or a company could purchase these and service a very wide area, as the threshing machine crews have done in the United States.

The future possibilities of trade with Korea are indicated not only by the foregoing sketch of some of its future needs, but also by the following tables of exports and imports. Although Korea's trade relations have been largely confined to Japan, the situation will, of course, be changed in the post-war period.

CHIEF EXPORTS OF KOREA, 1936

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Values in \$1,000</i>
Fish 1,000 pounds....	123,796	3,065
Rice 1,000 bushels....	43,369	72,832
Soybeans do.....	6,141	6,813
Fruits and nuts..... 1,000 pounds....	66,298	1,439
Raw cotton do.....	26,802	3,329
Raw silk do.....	4,162	5,761
Lumber		2,161
Cement metric tons....	294,219	1,717
Graphite do.....	39,166	657
Coal long tons.....	671,940	1,924
Iron metric tons....	239,429	5,266

CHIEF EXPORTS OF KOREA, 1936—*Continued*

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Values in \$1,000</i>
Copper (with gold and silver)		
1,000 pounds....	4,793	5,949
Leaddo.....	5,368	855
Iron oremetric tons....	242,887	321
Tungsten oredo.....	915	448
Gold oresdo.....	64,585	1,886
Fish oil and hardened oil		
1,000 pounds....	102,934	3,428
Fertilizersmetric tons....	512,702	11,733
Other commodities		42,607
<i>Total</i>		172,191

CHIEF IMPORTS OF KOREA, 1936

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Values in \$1,000</i>
Millet1,000 pounds....	406,532	6,589
Wheat flourdo.....	90,689	2,273
Sugardo.....	146,119	2,625
Barleydo.....	167,976	2,548
Vegetablesdo.....	182,600	1,632
Fruits and nuts.....do.....	94,965	1,521
Raw cottondo.....	58,913	6,604
Cotton textiles.....1,000 square yards	163,551	9,330
Wool textilesdo.....	9,987	3,845
Silk textilesdo.....	10,107	3,143
Rayon textilesdo.....	94,358	7,469
Clothing		9,922
Lumber		4,522
Paper		4,054
Coal1,000 tons....	1,544	5,000
Cementdo.....	214	2,148
Petroleum products.....1,000 barrels....	2,669	9,176

CHIEF IMPORTS OF KOREA, 1936—*Continued*

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Values in \$1,000</i>
Metals and ores.....	15,935
Metal manufactures	13,234
Machinery	13,288
Vehicles and parts	7,827
Chemicals	7,443
Fertilizersmetric tons.....	515,809	12,013
Other commodities	69,128
<i>Total</i>	221,269

Source: Tables of Trade and Shipping of Chosen (Korea). Blank spaces indicate quantity figures not available. Value figures have been converted at 29.022 cents per yen.

Korea's story is not ended. In a sense it is just beginning. For 4,000 years the country existed as an isolated Oriental state, homogeneous, culturally and economically self-contained. Since 1882, its experience has been turbulent and unsettled. While some degree of transition to Western ways and economic development has occurred, there has been little cultivation of its own cultural and social heritage. Alien customs and ideas have been forced upon it. In short, there has in recent years been little reason why the Korean people should regret the isolationism of their ancestors.

But they know they are living in a new world. And their sympathies and ties are with America. From the United States and Canada have come most of its visitors and missionaries and most of its non-Japanese business and industrial leadership. The idealism of Americans appeals to Koreans, even though their dependence on it in the treaty of 1882 and the Revolution of 1919 were of little avail. For the guidance and support Korea will need in reestablishing itself as a nation, it is certain to turn hopefully toward the United States.

PART FOUR

Appendices

APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX B

GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

In the attempt to Japanize Korea, Japanese officials have changed all the principal place names. The Korean forms have been erased and Japanese names put in their places. The result is exceedingly distasteful to Koreans, and very confusing to foreigners who attempt to make comparative studies of Korean and Japanese documents on Korea. For the convenience of readers who may want to make cross-references from this book to some of the numerous Japanese publications on Korea, the following table of place names is inserted.

PROVINCES		PRINCIPAL SEAPORTS	
<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>	<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Chusei-do	Choong-chung-do	Chinnampo	Chingnam-po
Heian-do	Peng-an-do	Fusan	Pusan
Keiki-do	Kyung-ki-do	Gensan	Won-san
Keisho-do	Kyung-sang-do	Jinsen	Chemulpo
Kogen-do	Kang-won-do	Joshin	Song-jin
Kokai-dō	Whang-hai-do	Kunsan	Kunsan
Kankyo-do	Ham-kyung-do	Basan	Masan
Zenra-do	Jul-la-do	Moppo	Mokpo
		Seishin	Chung-jin
		Shin-gishu	Shin-wiju
		Toeï	Tongyeng

PROVINCIAL CAPITALS

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Gishu	Wi-ju
Heijo	Pengyang
Kaishu	Hai-ju
Kanko	Ham-heung
Keijo	Seoul
Kwoshu	Kwang-ju
Koshu	Kong-ju
Ranan	Na-nam
Seishu	Chung-ju
Shinshu	Chin-ju
Shunsen	Chyong-chyon
Taikyū	Tai-ku
Zenshu	Jun-ju

PRINCIPAL ISLANDS

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Kyosai	Ku-jei
Saishu	Che-ju
Utsuryo	Wol-lung

PRINCIPAL MOUNTAINS

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Chohaku-san	Chang-paik-san
Shohaku-san	So-paik-san
Taihaku-san	Tai-paik-san

PRINCIPAL RIVERS

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Daido-ko	Tai-dong-gang
Kan-ko	Han-gang
Kin-ko	Kum-gang
Oryoku-ko	Ap-lok-gang
Kakuto-ko	Nak-dong-gang
Toman-ko	Tumen

PRINCIPAL BAYS

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Korean</i>
Chinkai	Chin-hai
Koryo	Kwang-nyang
Yeiko	Yong-hung

APPENDIX C

DE-CHRISTIANIZATION

Two documents illustrating the problems confronting Christianity under Japanese rule are appended. They are official statements propounded under Japanese compulsion by the two principal Korean Protestant Church bodies—Methodist and Presbyterian. The statements are enforced fundamental revisions of their respective church polity, designed to make them in effect non-Christian agencies of the Japanese Empire.

I

Statement adopted by the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church at Seoul, October 2, 1940

“It is urgent and proper that our Christians realize the true spirit of our country and the policy of amalgamation of Japan and Chosen; therefore, we, the people of the Korean Methodist Church, take the lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

REFORM PLANS FOR THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

I. Right Guidance of Thoughts

“1. To cause our members to understand the principles of

the New Order in East Asia and the amalgamation of Japan and Chosen.

"2. To make our people in the churches understand that the Christian idea of brotherhood is realized in the principle of eight pillars under one universe. ['Hakko Ichiu,' or the idea of a universal family of mankind, ascribed to Jimmu Tenno, the founder of the empire, 2,600 years ago.]

"3. To make our people understand the unity of patriotic loyalty and the Christian idea of sacrifice.

"4. To forbid the idea of the sovereignty of the people as contrary to the national polity of the Empire.

"5. To oppose individualism that has degenerated into selfishness.

"6. To oppose the idea of liberty which has degenerated into a devouring of the weak by the strong.

"7. To extirpate cruel and irreligious communism.

II. Reforming Education

"1. National Polity shall be taught in: (a) theological seminary; (b) colleges and professional schools; (c) middle and primary schools through the ethics courses.

"2. Military training: (a) Military training shall be given in the theological seminary; (b) new emphasis shall be placed on it as already taught in colleges and middle schools.

"3. Theological education: The Gospels (Christ's teachings and example) shall be the fundamental basis of theological training, separating therefrom Jewish history and pagan thoughts and usages which have crept in on the path of western cultural progress, and giving philosophies of Oriental saints.

III. Social Education

"1. Disseminating and upholding the Imperial Way: This shall be done: (a) by attendance at shrines, (b) in the church

organs, (c) by printed matter, (d) by lectures, (e) by discussion group meetings, (f) in Bible classes, (g) in special evangelistic meetings, (h) in personal preaching, etc.

"2. Defense against communism—national defense: (a) by means of the Union of National Spiritual Mobilization Movement; (b) by patriotic societies in the churches.

IV. Support of the Army

"1. Church members should be encouraged to enlist voluntarily in large numbers.

"2. To make church members understand the meaning of military duties.

"3. Church members should do their utmost to prevent espionage [*i.e.*, by Korean patriots].

V. Unified Control of Organizations

"1. The Korean Methodist Church and the Japan Methodist Church shall bring to reality their union.

"2. The Korean Methodist Church and its organizations, men's and women's work, receiving financial support from abroad, shall become independent of such support.

"3. Churches and institutions shall avoid placing in a place of leadership or representation, any foreigner.

"4. The Methodist theological seminary shall be entirely made over.

"5. The Central Council which is organized with the Methodist Missions shall be dissolved (but a committee of five, of whom one shall be the bishop, shall be chosen to contact the missionary group).

"6. In order to put into effect the above articles an executive secretariat of appropriate size shall be appointed by the bishop."

II

Official declaration of the Standing Committee of the Korean Presbyterian Church, November, 1940

"The Chosen Presbyterian Church passed a resolution at the 27th General Assembly in 1938 to participate in the shrine ceremony, and a resolution at the 28th Assembly to participate in the total national force movement, and sever relations with the European and American missionaries, while at the 29th General Assembly in 1940 it passed a resolution to revise the constitution and establish a new system, for which a Central Standing Committee has been established. Based on these resolutions we have determined our tenets and policies and publish this declaration to make ourselves clear at home and abroad.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

I. General

"On the basis of the fundamental idea of a corporation, we resolved to follow the direction of the authorities, to give up past misguided reliance on Europe and America in conformity to the State policy, and to purify and amend the Japanese Christianity, and at the same time to encourage the followers to render disinterested services in their respective business circles and go straight forward as loyal subjects of the Empire with one mind and united strength for the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

II. Essentials

"(1) We are resolved to set ourselves free from the past principles of reliance on Europe and America and establish a purely Japanese Christianity.

"(2) We are resolved to get back educational, Biblical and

all other institutions in Chosen under management of foreign missionaries and make them self-supporting institutions and have the foreign missionaries, who are in positions of directors, retire.

“(3) We are resolved to make radical reforms in the constitution, rituals, evangelization and all other structures.

III. Methods of Practice

“(1) Through observance of national constitution: (a) The Christian Schools, staffs and students, like all secular schools should participate in shrine ceremonies. (b) a flag pole should be put up in front of each church, and flags provided in all the followers' homes, and flags should be put up on all national holidays and other public occasions.

“(2) National observances: (a) bowing toward the Imperial Palace; (b) singing national anthem on national holidays and in other ceremonies; (c) reciting the Imperial subjects' oath.

IV. Reform of Structures

“(1) Establishment of a foundational juridical person of a control organ [*sic*, for censor!] to unify and improve all undertakings.

“(2) Amendment of the rules for allotting duties to church authorities.

“(3) Only subjects of the Empire are qualified for membership on the central organ.

“(4) Preachers are licensed by the General Assembly.

V. Establishment of a Committee for the Revision of the Constitution, Doctrines and Laws

“(1) Modification of the Constitution committee established in accordance with the resolution passed at the 29th

General Assembly to accelerate the drafting of the constitution.

“(2) Reconsideration of doctrines, laws, rituals, etc., so as to remove all that are democratic and establish a purely Japanese Christianity.

“(3) Examination of hymnals, Christian books and publications to amend all words and phrases which conflict with the national constitution.

VI. Institutions

“(1) Arrangements should be made to re-educate workers, and gather pastors, elders and workers together from time to time to encourage them to participate in shrine ceremony, to improve knowledge of the situation, join the total national force movement, prevent communism and espionage, and make efforts in all other ways to cultivate the spirit of Japan.

“(2) Issuance of an organ paper and other publications. Efforts should be made to improve the existing organ paper and set forth the national constitution and the knowledge of the situation in all publications.

VII. Retrocession of Institutes

“(1) Arrangements should be made to get back all educational, medical, social and other institutions and make the missionaries to retire.

“(2) Arrangements should be made to get back copyrights of Bibles, hymnals and all other religious works published by the missionaries.

VIII. Financial Independence

“The financial aid from the Board of Foreign Missions and individuals in America should be declined and efforts

should be made to establish a strong foundation to manage all the Institutes got back from the missionaries.

IX. Relation with the Christianity in Japan

“Arrangements should be made to maintain close relations with Japanese Christianity in Japan, for which purposes interchange of personnel should be made for training workers, and interchanges of various committees should be made for leading all undertakings in order to cooperate for consolidating Japanese Christianity in support of the establishment of the New Order in East Asia.”

APPENDIX D

UNITED SUPPORT

At present the Provisional Government in Chungking is supported by a coalition of four parties. The Independence Party, led by Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, is represented in the cabinet by seven members; the National Revolutionary Party by five; the Communist Party by one; and the Anarchist Party by one.

On April 26, 1944, the National Council, under the revised constitution, elected the following State Councillors: Chairman, Kim Koo; Vice-Chairman, Kiusic Kimm; Councillors, Lee Si-yung; Cho Sung-whan, Whang-Hak-su, Cho Wan-ku, Park Chan-ik, Cha Yi-suk, Tjo Sowang, Ahn Hun, Chang Kun-sang, Kim Poong-jun, Sung Chu-sik, Kim Yaksan, Kim Sun-suk, Liu Rim. This coalition program represents practically all parties; namely, the Independent Party, the People's Revolutionary Party, the Korean Emancipation League, and the so-called Anarchist League. Since all of the above mentioned have pledged their loyal support and allegiance to the Provisional Government, complete unity has been achieved.

On April 27, 1944, Kim Koo, Chairman of the Coalition

Cabinet and President of the Provisional Government, issued from Chungking the following statement: "The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea has completed the unification of parties within its executive and legislative branches. The fact that all of our political parties now have pledged their loyal support and patriotic service to their Government brings added confidence and strength to its work. It is our sincere belief, that our compatriots in the Western Hemisphere will speedily follow suit and wholeheartedly cooperate in all things among themselves for the greater good of our common cause."

The Dongji Hoi, largest organization of Koreans in the United States, issued the following manifesto during its Continental Conferences held at Honolulu on December 12-26, 1943, and in Los Angeles on January 5, 1944:

"I. We will most energetically and loyally serve the cause of the United States of America at war.

"II. We will most energetically and loyally support the supreme Korean authority, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea exiled in Chungking, and its official organ, the Korean Commission in Washington.

"III. We will petition the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea for issuance of Korean War Loans to be used in our war efforts.

"IV. We will immediately put in motion a definite program to further solidify the unity among all Koreans abroad so as to be of better service to the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in its participation with the United Nations in our war against Japan.

"V. We will diligently collect the Korean Independence Fund and forward same to the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea through the Korean Commission."

Of historical significance is the statement issued on Novem-

ber 1, 1919, by the Chong kan-pu, a general executive committee uniting all revolutionary groups, under the chairmanship of Yi Sang-chai, indicating the basis upon which the Provisional Government was founded:

"The Central Committee of the Thirteen Provinces of Korea pray with all our hearts for the health of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee. We are deeply moved by the devotion to the cause of our country shown by Koreans as well as foreigners.

"Since the Declaration of Independence of Korea on March 1, 1919, the following organizations have worked, separately and together, urging the people to demonstrate publicly, publishing the newspapers and magazines listed, and making speeches throughout the country in order to fill the people with enthusiasm and desire for independence:

Independence Party	Independence News
Great Cooperative Party	Cooperative News
Renovation Party	Renovation News
Liberty Party	Liberty Bell Morning News
National Party	National News
Patriotic Party	Warning People News
Central Y. M. C. A.	Enlightening (Magazine)
Young Men's Diplomatic Party	New Women's News
New Women's Party	Iron & Blood (Magazine)

"The set-up and practice of our ruling power is still incomplete because it is in a foreign country, of necessity, so it is quite impossible to carry out its functions in Korea proper. For this reason our General Committee, representing the governmental system, arranged the following eight departments:

General Secretary, T. S. Youn	Police Dept., P. D. Song
Negotiation Dept., K. Park	Labor Dept., S. M. Park
Communication Dept., J. C. Kim	Finance Dept., H. Kang
	Editor-in-Chief, S. O. Cho

"The above department heads take charge of provinces, prefectures and districts; towns were divided according to the official regulations; governmental agencies were established to organize a system of secret communications.

"All governmental affairs are being conducted according to the above set-up. The public is turning to the will of God, except for some wealthy people and officers who watch the situation from a distance. But the will of the majority will prevail and make a sound foundation for our National Independence.

"Long Live the Great Korea! Long Live our President!"

APPENDIX E

COMMUNIST SUPPORT

The following document is the summarized Manifesto of the Sixth Plenary Congress of the Korean National Revolutionary Party, adopted in December 1941 and published by the *National Herald*, a newspaper printed in Chungking, on January 14 and 15, 1942.

I. The International Situation

"The sufferings that the Korean people have endured under Japanese oppression are greater than those of any other country and their hatred of Fascism is proportionately deeper. They realize that their only hope of gaining independence and liberty lies in closer cooperation with all the other countries fighting the Fascists. They must, both at home and abroad, engage in the common struggle for now is the best opportunity when Japan confronts enemies on all sides in the Pacific, for their attempt to recover their independence and liberty."

II. Internal Conditions in Korea

"Japanese abandoned pre-Mukden incident slogans: 'self government,' 'Korean participation in the government of the

country,' and 'Korean cultural movements.' Replaced by: 'Korean-Japanese Identity,' 'Korean-Japanese Equality,' 'Subjects of the Empire.' Korea is called an 'extension of Japan' and the name Korea replaced by 'peninsula.'

"Korean language [has been] forbidden.

"Korean family names [have been] compulsorily changed to Japanese.

"All Korean citizen bodies [have been] disbanded.

"Korean schools [have been] reorganized into joint Japanese schools.

"Korean 4,000-year-old culture [has been] replaced by 'peninsula type of Imperial culture.'

"Korean language newspapers and magazines [have been] suppressed.

"Christian and Buddhist religions [have been] put under Japanese control and belief in Shinto mythology compulsory.

"Twenty-six prisons [have been] expanded to 'Protective observation' prisons in all cities.

"Korea [has been] designated as: 1. Cantonment Base, meaning conscription of men and resources; 2. Peninsula Granary, 10-year grain plan to increase exports from 20 to 60 million piculs; 3. Cultural Base, amalgamating Koreans, Chinese, Manchurians with the Japanese race.

"One hundred and forty-five thousand laborers [have been] impressed for China, Manchuria and Japan.

"Wages of Korean workers [are] less than half those of Japanese in Korea.

"Korean League of Citizens' Total Strength" [has been] organized to force Korean donations to Japan's war.

III. Development of the Korean Revolutionary Movement

"Forty years ago, Japan was progressive and supported by Great Britain and U. S. A., while the Korean court was back-

ward from capitalistic point of view. After revolutionary movement of March, 1919, the Japanese realized they could not subdue Korea by force alone. After Mukden, 1931, they adopted the guise of 'Korean-Japanese Concord' and 'Korean-Japanese Equality.' Eventual Japanese collapse on the continent of Asia is in the making in Korea.

IV. Character and Principles of the Korean Revolution

"With the exception of a few traitors and catspaws who enrich themselves at their country's expense and a very small number of capitalists operating as compradores for the Japanese, the Korean people were excluded from Capitalistic activity.

"Farmers, 80% of population, are poverty stricken.

"The revolution aims at overthrowing the alien rule of Japanese Imperialism and also at expelling the last vestiges of the old feudal court now still supported by the Japanese, in place of which a free and democratic system of government will be set up.

"We have drawn up the following outline of our party's aims and activities:

"1. To overthrow Japanese Imperialist rule and establish in Korea a free, independent and democratic republic.

"2. To summon a people's assembly which is to frame a constitution and make arrangements for the holding of a general election.

"3. To eliminate the vestiges of the old feudal system and catspaws of the Japanese.

"4. To confiscate the property of all Japanese imperialists and traitors and deprive all those who have served the Japanese of their property, rights and privileges.

"5. To afford special protection for the business enterprises of those citizens who have opposed Fascism.

"6. To institute an agrarian revolution and redistribute the land among the tenant farmers.

"7. To reduce working hours and put into force various measures of social security for the benefit of the workers.

"8. To establish political, economic and social equality of the sexes.

"9. To institute freedom of speech, publication, assembly and worship.

"10. To institute compulsory education, vocational training and social insurance to be conducted at the expense of the state.

"11. To seek cooperation with all other countries in the world on a basis of equality and mutual assistance in the pursuit of the peace and happiness of mankind."

V. The Tasks and Policy of the Party Overseas

"In 1935 our party was organized at a great distance from the home country, but the chief elements of its composition were drawn from the finest material of the Korean Revolution, from the Korean Volunteer Corps, the Korean Independence Party, the New Korean Independence Party and the Great Korean Independence Party, in all some thousands of revolutionary party men with years of experience acquired in the Northeast, in China proper, and in America. The present party is the first united organization of the kind to appear in the history of the Korean revolution.

"The party's failures and errors have been numerous in the past, mostly committed by those who have become separated abroad from the masses and the practical problems of the struggle.

"We now organize the 'Korean National Front Federation.'

"The party had always been indifferent to the question of

the Korean Provisional Government. One reason was that such a government is able to exercise no real authority until our national territory is recovered. A second reason was that it had not been recognized or supported by other countries. A third reason was that the present Provisional Government is neither representative of the various revolutionary bodies nor has it been lawfully elected by the Korean people. The party always regarded the mere maintenance of the machinery of a nominal provisional government as unnecessary.

"Of late, however, changes in the situation have caused the party to abandon this attitude. In May 1941 it was decided to join and support the Provisional Government, because the democratic countries of the world have now formed an anti-Fascist bloc and gone to war with the Fascist powers, and in Europe there have been set up such refugee governments as those of Poland, Holland and France which have been recognized and assisted by the democratic countries. Therefore a similar Korean Government may now hope also to gain their recognition and assistance. The Chinese Government is preparing to afford it positive assistance which will undoubtedly be of great value to the cause of the revolution.

"In deciding to support the Provisional Government the party advocates measures whereby it may be rendered more representative of the Korean people. It hopes that a representative assembly of all revolutionary organizations and groups will be called and the Provisional Government given supreme command over them. The party also advocates the participation of all Koreans abroad in China, in the Soviet Union, and in the United States in the war of resistance being waged by those countries, simultaneously with their efforts to further the revolution. Koreans in Japan should also lend their cooperation and assistance to the anti-war movement there. The endeavor should be to create a soli-

ilarity of all Koreans overseas and effect a coordination of their efforts with those of revolutionaries at home. We must at the same time work and fight together, with China, Britain, America, Russia and other powers opposed to Fascism.

“Strive, party comrades and fellow-countrymen, strive for the recovery of our country’s sacred soil, for the freedom and happiness of our 30,000,000 fellow-citizens, for the overthrow of the hated Japanese oppressors and for the creation of a new free and independent Korea! Forward to victory!”

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